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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- UNnTED STATES V. GOLDBERG: THE THIRD
CIRCUIT'S NONTRADITIONAL APPROACH TO WAIVER OF THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
I. INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is fundamental to a fair trial.1
Indeed, the right to counsel is "an essential barrier against ... deprivation
of human rights. '2 While the Sixth Amendment is the source of the right
1. SeeUnited States v. Fulton, 5 F.3d 605, 611 (2d Cir. 1993) (citingJohnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) ("[T]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel is
necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty.").
The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides procedural
safeguards in order to ensure a just resolution of criminal matters. Randall B.
Bateman, Federal and State Perspectives on Criminal Defendant's Right to Self-Representa-
tion, 20J. CONTEMP. L. 77, 81 (1994). For example, the Sixth Amendment is the
source of the right to a speedy trial, the right to be informed of accusations, a
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses and the right to the assistance of coun-
sel. Id. The Sixth Amendment rights are fundamental to our criminal justice pro-
cess. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975) (discussing history of Sixth
Amendment). Because they are fundamental, they are part of the "due process of
law" guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the defendants in the state
criminal courts. Id.; see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963) (declaring
Sixth Amendment right to counsel applicable to states).
The United States Constitution has two separate provisions for the right to
assistance of counsel. C. Allen Parker, Jr., Proposed Requirements for Waiver of Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 363, 363 (1982). The Fifth Amend-
ment right to counsel provides protection during custodial interrogation. Id.; Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 440 (1966). This protects a defendant from
compulsory self-incrimination. Howard M. Kaufer, Constitutional Law: Right to
Counsel, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 399, 400 (1981). Miranda warnings originate in the
Fifth Amendment, requiring that the government inform the accused of the right
to remain silent, to talk to a lawyer and to have counsel present during interroga-
tion. Id. These warnings must be given to anyone in custody. Id. The Sixth
Amendment right to counsel does not attach until criminal proceedings against a
defendant begin. Id. at 401. Although the Fifth and Sixth Amendments provide
protection at different times during the criminal justice process, they are basically
the same in function. Parker, supra, at 365. They both grant the accused the right
to counsel. Id.
2. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 462-63. The right to counsel "is one of the safeguards of
the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of
life and liberty." Id. at 462. Courts have consistently recognized the importance of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See, e.g., Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S.
365, 377 (1986) ("The right of an accused to counsel is beyond question a funda-
mental right .... Without counsel the right to a fair trial itself would be of little
consequence . . .. for it is through counsel that the accused secures his other
rights."); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984) ("Of all the rights that
an accused has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive
for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have."); Bland v. California
Dep't of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1478 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 357
(1173)
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to assistance of counsel, it also includes the right to waive counsel.3 At-
tempting to balance the Sixth Amendment's inherent tension, the United
States Supreme Court provided general guidelines to determine a valid
waiver in Faretta v. California.4 The Court left the task of determining the
(1994) ("[D]eprivation of counsel is a structural defect requiring automatic
reversal.").
3. See Bateman, supra note 1, at 79 (stating Sixth Amendment includes right
to counsel and right to waive counsel); see also United States v. Purnett, 910 F.2d
51, 54 (2d Cir. 1990) ("The right to self-representation and the right to assistance
of counsel are separate rights depicted on the opposite sides of the same Sixth
Amendment coin."). The Sixth Amendment has an inherent tension. Bateman,
supra note 1, at 81. It supports the values of justice with the right to counsel. Id.
In addition, it supports the right of self-determination with the right to waive coun-
sel and proceed pro se. Id.; see Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819 (recognizing right of de-
fendant to waive counsel and proceed pro se). This tension did not become
apparent, however, until courts began to appoint counsel. Bateman, supra note 1,
at 81. Courts at first focused solely on reaching the most just result. Id. After the
right to self-representation was recognized in Faretta v. California, the focus
changed to the defendant's right to choose whether or not to have representation.
United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 248 (6th Cir. 1987); Bateman, supra note
1, at 81 n.9. The McDowell court explained that "[b]efore 1975, constitutional de-
terminations of the voluntariness of a waiver of counsel were motivated primarily
by the need to protect accused persons from the dire consequences of rash ges-
tures. In that year, however, the Supreme Court decided Faretta v. California, and
accorded constitutional significance to the right to self-representation." Id. (cita-
tions omitted).
Sixth Amendment waiver arises in three contexts. Parker, supra note 1, at 381.
One instance is when an accused requests before a trial judge to represent him or
herself. Id. Another instance where Sixth Amendment waiver arises is during in-
terrogation when an accused confesses or otherwise makes incriminating state-
ments during face-to-face "deliberate elicitation" by state officers. Id. A third
instance is when a defendant voluntarily confesses or makes incriminating state-
ments to a state officer. Id. This Casebrief only discusses waiver before a judge.
For a detailed discussion of the other instances where Sixth Amendment waiver
issues arise, see id.
The procedural requirements for waiver of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
right to counsel are different. Parker, supra note 1, at 364. The Fifth Amendment
right to counsel is protected by clear standards as set out in the Miranda warning.
Id. Waiver is impossible unless these warnings are first given. Id. In contrast, the
Sixth Amendment waiver of the right to counsel does not have any prophylactic
warnings. Id. Instead, there are only general guidelines, making the standards for
Sixth Amendment waiver much less clear. Id.
4. 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). The United States Supreme Court held that only
knowing and intelligent waiver of right to counsel is valid. Id.; see also United States
v. McCaskill, 585 F.2d 189, 190 (6th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) ("There was thus no
occasion in Faretta to lay down detailed guidelines concerning what tests or lines of
inquiry a trial judge is required to conduct in order to determine whether a de-
fendant has 'knowingly and intelligently' chosen to forgo the benefits of coun-
sel."). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's holding in Faretta, see infra notes
66-73 and accompanying text.
Correlative to the right to waive counsel is the right to proceed pro se. JOSEPH
G. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE AcCUSED § 7.13, at 303 (2d ed. 1986).
The right to self-representation is unique because it forces a defendant to waive
one constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, for another. Id. at
379. Furthermore, the defendant would almost always be better off if he or she
agreed to assistance of counsel. Id. The defendant must make a timely request to
1174 [Vol. 41: p. 1173
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specific requirements for a valid waiver to the lower courts. 5 Unfortu-
nately, the Faretta guidelines have proven too vague and a split among the
circuits currently exists over the requirements for a valid waiver of the
right to counsel.
6
proceed pro se. Id. at 380. Once the trial has begun, the right to represent oneself
may be denied. Id. at 381. Also, a defendant that chooses initially to proceed pro
se is prohibited from changing his or her mind during the trial. Id. at 385.
The right to represent oneself, like the right to waive counsel, must be bal-
anced against society's interest in an orderly and efficient criminal justice system.
Stacey A. Giulianti, Comment, The Right to Proceed Pro Se at Competency Hearings:
Practical Solutions to a Constitutional Catch-22, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 883, 890 (1993).
Thus, the right to proceed pro se is limited in several ways. Id. First, when defend-
ants proceed pro se, they give up the benefits of the right to counsel. Id. Also, the
court may terminate the right to proceed pro se if the defendant engages in "seri-
ous or obstructionist" misconduct. Id. (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 n.46). Fur-
thermore, a defendant who proceeds pro se also gives up the right to claim
ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. As one author noted, "[i] t would be a strange
system indeed that allowed a defendant to freely select self-representation and
thereby create a safety net for reversal based on her legal ineptitude." Id. at 892.
Despite the advantages of assistance of counsel, courts recognize that the de-
fendant's right to choose whether or not to have a lawyer is fundamental. Id. at
893. A trial court cannot force counsel upon an unwilling defendant. Id. For a
detailed discussion of the right to self-representation, see CooK, supra, at 377-97.
5. See Parker, supra, note 1, at 364 (noting failure of Supreme Court to pro-
vide waiver requirements, leaving for lower courts to determine). Inconsistent ap-
plication of waiver requirements among the courts are one result of the Supreme
Court's broad guidelines. Id. An associated problem created by the lack of clear
standards for waiver is that courts are not able to recognize when a waiver is valid
or invalid. Id. Thus, a time-consuming hearing must be held in order to deter-
mine whether waiver is appropriate. Id. Furthermore, this lack of clear require-
ments has resulted in confusion over proper investigatory techniques once in
police custody. Id.
6. See United States v. McDowell, 484 U.S. 980, 980 (1987) (White, J., dissent-
ing) (discussing split among circuit courts over requirements for valid waiver). Jus-
tice White, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented from a denial of a writ of
certiorari, citing the confusion in the circuit courts and the state courts over the
proper application of the Faretta requirements. Id.
With all of the advantages of having assistance of counsel, it is difficult to
understand why a defendant would waive the right to counsel and choose to pro-
ceed pro se. GILBERT B. STUCKEY, PROCEDURES IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 141, 148-49
(3d ed. 1986); Giulianti, supra note 4, at 887. A common warning of a judge to a
defendant seeking waiver is that "when a person seeks to represent himself he has
a fool for a lawyer and a fool for a client." August K Anderson, Note, People v.
Longwith: The Requirements of Court Advisement in Assuring a Knowing and Intelligent
Waiver of Right to Counsel 5 CRIM. JUST. J. 379, 379 (1982). Nevertheless, defend-
ants frequently choose to forgo the right to counsel and represent themselves. Id.
There are a variety of reasons that a defendant may choose to waive the right to
counsel. Giulianti, supra note 4, at 887. One common reason is that defendants
believe that jurors will sympathize with the "lone defendant" standing up against
the "Goliath" state. Id. Another reason is that defendants believe that they are
innocent and that the criminal justice system will inevitably find the truth. Id.
These defendants are surprised when they realize that there is a rigid courtroom
procedure to follow, prohibiting much of the evidence and questioning that they
planned. Id. Some defendants seek to waive counsel because they simply distrust
attorneys or doubt their capabilities. STUCKEY, supra, at 149. This often stems from
an attorney failing to keep in touch with a defendant or an overwhelming caseload
3
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Traditional waiver analysis recognizes only one form of waiver-it is a
blanket term, applied in the same manner, despite the wide variety of cir-
cumstances that lead to waiver.7 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, however, recently added a new dimension to the con-
cept of waiver when it held that waiver of the right to counsel analytically is
divided into three categories: "waiver," "waiver by conduct" and "forfei-
ture."8 In United States v. Goldberg,9 the Third Circuit determined that the
appropriate category depends upon the circumstances of the case, includ-
ing the severity of a defendant's conduct and the scope and extent ofjudi-
cial advisement about the consequences of waiver. 10 In Goldberg, the court
found that the defendant's abusive conduct toward his attorney did not
fall under the rubric of traditional waiver analysis." The court held that
waiver of the right to counsel due to the defendant's misconduct may oc-
cur either by waiver by conduct or forfeiture. 12 The court found that the
requirements for a waiver by conduct were not satisfied, and further de-
clined to adopt a forfeiture analysis.13 Thus, the court concluded that the
defendant's misconduct had not waived his right to counsel.1 4
The analytical categories of waiver discussed in Goldberg have signifi-
cant consequences on both a defendant's constitutional right to counsel
and the right to waive counsel. 15 In order to comprehend the importance
of the attorney. Giulianti, supra note 4, at 887. In addition, some defendants be-
lieve that their counsel does not have their best interests at stake. STUCKEY, supra,
at 149. Furthermore, defendants may disagree with an attorney's trial strategy. Id.;
Giulianti, supra note 4, at 888. Finally, some defendants take advantage of the fact
that by representing themselves, they are permitted to consult with co-defendants
and witnesses out of the courtroom, thus permitting them to conspire against the
government. STUCKEY, supra, at 149.
7. See United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1100 (3d Cir. 1995) (explain-
ing that no court has made distinction among different types of waiver). The cir-
cumstances of waiver vary-some defendants may affirmatively choose to waive the
right to counsel, while others may imply waiver of the right to counsel by their own
conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Arlt, 41 F.3d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1994) (recogniz-
ing defendants may voluntarily seek to represent themselves); United States v.
Bauer, 956 F.2d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding defendant's failure to retain
counsel implied waiver); McQueen v. Blackburn, 755 F.2d 1174, 1178 (5th Cir.
1985) (finding defendant's request to remove counsel during trial was valid
waiver). For a further discussion of the various circumstances in which waiver is
found, see infra notes 74-117 and accompanying text.
8. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1101.
9. 67 F.3d 1092, 1101 (3d Cir. 1995).
10. Id. at 1100-02. For a complete discussion of the Third Circuit's analytical
categories of waiver analysis in Goldberg, see infra notes 141-73 and accompanying
text.
11. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1103. For a full discussion of the court's reasoning in
Goldberg, see infra notes 141-73 and accompanying text.
12. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1101.
13. Id. at 1102.
14. Id. at 1103. For a complete discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis of
the defendant's conduct in Goldberg, see infra notes 141-73 and accompanying text.
15. See Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1101 (emphasizing administrative and substantive
impact of these waiver categories on Sixth Amendment). Without waiver require-
[Vol. 41: p. 11731176
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of an appropriate analysis of the waiver of the right to counsel, an overview
of the history of the right to counsel is necessary. Part II of this Casebrief
traces the development of the right to counsel from the early colonies to
the present.' 6 Part II also examines the right to waive counsel, including
the Supreme Court's guidelines.1 7 Further, Part II examines the split
among the circuits over the elements of a valid waiver.1 8 This includes a
discussion of the various circumstances where waiver of the right to coun-
sel may be found. 19 Moreover, Part II explores the Third Circuit's ap-
proach to waiver of the right to counsel prior to the Goldberg decision.20
Parts III and IV of this Casebrief discuss the facts and analyze the Goldberg
decision.2 1 Finally, Part V asserts that although the Third Circuit took an
important step in establishing three categories of waiver, courts need to
properly balance the right to counsel and the right to waive counsel in
order to prevent defendants' manipulation of the criminal justice system
through egregious behavior towards his or her attorney.2 2
ments, there is no clear guidance for judges, and inconsistent application of the
right to waive the Sixth Amendment right to counsel occurs. Parker, supra note 1,
at 365-66. Because the courts do not know whether or not a waiver should be
implied, time-consuming hearings are conducted. Id. This affects the administra-
tive efficiency of the court system. Id. Furthermore, clear standards are necessary
to aid the trial judge in making the difficult decision whether to allow waiver of the
right to counsel. Michael C. Krikava & Charlann E. Winking, The Right of an Indi-
gent Criminal Defendant to Proceed Pro Se On Appeal: By Statute or Constitution, A Neces-
sary Evil, 15 WM. MITCHELL L. Rv. 103, 107 (1989). The court must resolve the
tension between the defendant's right to choose to represent him or herself and
the court's knowledge that this choice will lead to the defendant's conviction. Id.
The court must also consider society's interests in preventing wrongful convictions
and the efficient administration of the courts. Bateman, supra note 1, at 104-05.
One court summed up the difficult position of the trial court when faced with a
waiver of the right to counsel as follows:
An overprotective judge who refuses to allow a defendant to jeopardize
his own defense may be reversed, and a judge who does not make a copi-
ous inquiry into the thought process of the accused (which may them-
selves be characterized as trial strategy) is subject to an appeal such as
that presently before this court.
United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 248-49 (6th Cir. 1987).
16. For a discussion of the development of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, see infra notes 23-47 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the development of the right to waive the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, see infra notes 48-73 and accompanying text.
18. For a further discussion of the split among the circuits over the require-
ments for a valid waiver, see infra notes 74-92 and accompanying text.19. For a further discussion of the various circumstances where waiver is
found, see infra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
20. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's approach to waiver analysis,
see infra notes 118-27 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the facts and reasoning of the Goldberg court, see infra
notes 128-73 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of the impact of the opinion in Goldberg, see infra notes
199-205 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Development of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
The common law of England did not recognize a general right to
counsel.28 The American colonists, however, adopted the right to counsel
as part of their due process of law.24 The right to counsel was subse-
quently incorporated in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution.25 This right to assistance of counsel was qualified, though,
applying only to federal prosecutions and only to defendants who could
afford to retain their own counsel. 26
The Supreme Court did not affirmatively recognize the right to ap-
pointed counsel in federal cases for indigent defendants until Powell v.
23. STUCKEY, supra note 6, at 141. Under the common law of England, a crim-
inal defendant was entitled only to counsel for a misdemeanor charge. Id. There
was no right to assistance of counsel for a felony charge. Id. Numerous theories
exist to explain this paradoxical rule. Id. One reason suggested is that it was
thought that the judge would be more sympathetic in felony cases than for minor
charges because of the potentially severe consequences. Id. Another reason sug-
gested is that the king wanted to deny defendants accused of a felony the right to
counsel because the chances for conviction increased, thus also increasing the
chances for the confiscation of the felon's property. Id. This common law existed
in England until 1836, when Parliament finally recognized the right to assistance
of counsel in felony proceedings. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932).
24. Powel4 287 U.S. at 60. Almost all of the Colonies adopted the right to
counsel as part of their due process of law. Id. at 61. Twelve of the thirteen origi-
nal Colonies adopted the right to counsel prior to the signing of the Constitution.
FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 109 (1961). Maryland's colonial constitution reflected a typical declaration
of this right: "'That, in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right... to be
allowed counsel .... .' Powell, 287 U.S. at 61 (quoting MD. CONST. of 1776, art.
XIX). The purpose of these provisions in state constitutions was to provide the
privilege of counsel that English rules prohibited. HELLER, supra, at 109-10.
25. STUCKEY, supra note 6, at 141. For the relevant text of the Sixth Amend-
ment, see supra note 1.
26. STUCKEY, supra note 6, at 141. The states included similar provisions for
the right to counsel in their state constitutions or statutes. Id. These provisions
reflected the Sixth Amendment's wording, usually providing that "[iun criminal
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend, and in person
and with counsel." Id.; see also Powel4 287 U.S. at 61-64 (discussing early states'
constitutional and statutory provisions for right to counsel). The purpose of the
provision for the right to counsel was to change the prior common law of England.
HELLER, supra note 24, at 110. The right to appointed counsel was not recognized.
STUCKEY, supra note 6, at 141. Early interpretations of the right to counsel defined
this right to mean that if an accused appeared in court with counsel, the accused
could not be denied the assistance of counsel. Id. The Judiciary Act of 1789 re-
flected this intent to merely allow the representation by counsel: "That in all the
courts of the United States the parties may plead and manage their own causes
personally or by the assistance of such counsel ... as by the rules of the said courts
..... HELLER, supra note 24, at 110 (quoting Act of April 30, 1970, 1 Stat. 112, 119
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 503 (1940))). The limited nature of the early
Sixth Amendment was illustrated in the Federal Crimes Act of 1790, in which Con-
gress required courts to assign counsel for defendants in capital cases. Id. Con-
gress would not have enacted such a law if the right to appointed counsel was
recognized to exist within the Sixth Amendment. Id.
1178 [Vol. 41: p. 1173
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Alabama.2 7 In Powel4 the defendants were illiterate and unable to afford
counsel, and they were rushed to trial and convicted with the token assist-
ance of the "entire bar."28 The Supreme Court held that the failure to
provide for the assistance of counsel violated the defendants' due
process rights.2 9 The Court held that in any capital case, the trial
27. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Notably, this was not a Sixth Amendment case, but
instead involved a claim decided under the "fundamental fairness" doctrine of the
Fourteenth Amendment. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE § 11.1, at 519 (2d ed. 1992). Later, when the Court discarded the fundamen-
tal fairness interpretation in favor of selective incorporation analysis, it rendered
the Sixth Amendment applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Id.
28. Powel=4 287 U.S. at 49. This case involved six African American defendants
accused of raping two Caucasian girls in Alabama, a capital offense. Id. The case
was tried in a racially charged atmosphere. Id. at 51. Although the court's record
did not report the defendants' ages, they were clearly "youthful." Id. at 51-52.
They were also "ignorant," "illiterate" and far from their homes. Id. at 52.
The Supreme Court addressed the precise issue whether the defendants were
substantively denied their right to counsel. Id. At their arraignment, the defend-
ants were never asked if they had or intended to retain counsel. Id. The trial court
never even asked if they had friends or families who might help them. Id. The
trial began six days after their indictment. Id. at 53. The court "appointed all the
members of the bar" to represent the defendants. Id. A few attorneys agreed to
help the defendants, but the extent to which they would represent the defendants'
cause was far from clear. Id. at 56. Thus, the defendants were denied their right to
counsel "during perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings against these
defendants, that is to say, from the time of their arraignment until the beginning
of their trial, when consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation
were vitally important .... " Id. at 57.
29. Id. at 58. Specifically, the Supreme Court found that "[i]n the light of the
facts... we think the failure of the trial court to give [the defendants] reasonable
time and opportunity to secure counsel was a clear denial of due process." Id. at
71. The Court emphasized that the counsel which agreed to help the defendants
did not do so until the morning of the trial. Id. at 57. Counsel, therefore, had no
time to prepare the case. Id. The Court explained that these "young, ignorant,
illiterate" defendants were "thus put in peril of their lives within a few moments
after counsel for the first time charged with any degree of responsibility began to
represent them." Id. at 57-58. Relying on precedent, the Court declared that it
was useless to give a defendant his or her day in court without an opportunity to
prepare for it. Id. (citations omitted). Finding that the right to counsel was a
fundamental right, the Court explained the significance of counsel:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no
skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, gener-
ally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad.
He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of coun-
sel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon
incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise
inadmissable .... He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step
in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he
faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish
his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more
true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.
Id. at 69.
7
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judge must appoint counsel if the defendant cannot afford an
attorney. 30
The Supreme Court extended the right to assistance of counsel to all
federal criminal defendants in Johnson v. Zerbst.31 The defendants in
Zerbst, charged with a felony, were tried and convicted without counsel
because the forum state only provided counsel for defendants charged
with a capital crime.3 2  In a habeas corpus petition, the defendants
claimed that the trial court denied them their Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. 33 The Supreme Court agreed, concluding that the Sixth Amend-
ment prohibits the federal courts, in all criminal proceedings, from depriv-
ing an accused of life or liberty unless the defendant has assistance of
counsel at trial.3 4 The Court emphasized the importance of representa-
tion, stating that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel "embodies a real-
istic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not
have the . . . skill to protect himself ... before a tribunal with power to
take his life or liberty."33 The Court concluded: if the right to counsel is
not provided, justice will not be done.3 6
30. Id. at 71. The Court declined to determine whether this right to counsel
attaches in other criminal proceedings. Id. The Court limited its holding, stating
that "where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable ade-
quately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illit-
eracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign
counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law." Id. The right to
have counsel appointed, the Court reasoned, was "a logical corollary from the con-
stitutional right to be heard by counsel." Id. at 72.
31. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
32. Id. at 460. This case involved two marines on leave who were indicted for
"uttering," passing and possessing counterfeit money. Id. at 459. The trial was
held immediately after their indictment. Id. at 460. The defendants requested
that the District Attorney appoint counsel for them. Id. The District Attorney later
denied that the defendants ever asked him for help. Id. at 460-61.
Although they had counsel for the Grand Jury proceeding two months prior
to the trial, they were unable to retain counsel for the trial itself. Id. at 460. The
defendants were tried, convicted and sentenced to four and one-half years impris-
onment. Id. The defendants attempted to represent themselves. Id. Comment-
ing on one of the defendant's defense, the prosecution conceded that he
"conducted his defence about as well as the average layman usually does in cases of
a similar nature." Id. at 461.
33. Id. The District Court denied the defendants' habeas corpus petition be-
cause the defendants did not attempt to get a message to the judge indicating that
they needed appointed counsel. Id. Although the district court agreed that the
defendants' right to counsel was violated, the judge did not believe that was suffi-
cient to "make the trial void and justify its annulment in a habeas corpus proceed-
ing." Id. at 459. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's opinion. Id.
34. Id. at 463. The Court noted that the defendants had little education, no
money and were far from any friends or family. Id. at 460. The Court relied on its
earlier opinion in Powell v. Alabama to illustrate the fundamental nature of the
right to counsel in any proceeding. Id. at 463 n.10.
35. Id. at 462-63.
36. Id. at 462. Furthermore, counsel is necessary because "[t]hat which is
simple, orderly and necessary to the lawyer, to the untrained layman may appear
intricate, complex and mysterious." Id. at 463. The Court explained that the Sixth
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The obligation to provide assistance of counsel for defendants in
criminal proceedings was extended to the states in Gideon v. Wainright.3 7
Charged with a felony and unable to afford retained counsel, the defend-
ant in Gideon requested court appointed counsel.3 8 His request was de-
nied, and after attempting to represent himself, he was convicted.3 9 The
Supreme Court granted habeas corpus relief and held that the trial court
denied the defendant his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of coun-
sel.4 ° Citing the fundamental nature of the right to counsel, the Court
concluded that counsel must be provided for any defendant brought to
trial, regardless of the charge.4 1
Amendment guarantees fundamental human rights of life and liberty. Id. These
fundamental rights, the Court noted, include the "humane policy" that an indi-
gent defendant be provided with counsel. Id. (citing Patton v. United States, 281
U.S. 276, 308 (1934)).
37. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In Gideon, the Court rendered the Sixth Amend-
ment directly applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, consis-
tent with the selective incorporation doctrine. See id. at 342 (concluding that Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is fundamental right); LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note
27, at 522 (stating that right to counsel is fundamental).
38. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337. The defendant was charged with breaking and
entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor, a felony under Florida law. Id. at
336. The defendant, lacking money or counsel, pleaded to the trial court that
"[t]he United States Supreme Court says I am entitled to be represented by Coun-
sel." Id. at 337. The trial court informed the defendant that in Florida, counsel is
only appointed in capital cases. Id.
39. Id. The defendant attempted to conduct his own defense. Id. Despite his
efforts, making an opening statement, cross-examining witnesses and presenting
his own witnesses, the jury returned a guilty verdict. Id. The defendant was sen-
tenced to five years in prison. Id. The defendant then filed a habeas corpus peti-
tion, claiming that the trial court denied his "Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights." Id. at 337 n.1.
40. Id. at 345. The Court rejected the precedent of Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455
(1942). In Betts, the Court concluded that the right to counsel in state court was
not a fundamental right implicated in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Betts, 316 U.S. at 461-62. Overruling Betts, the Court concluded that
Betts was an anomaly-"an abrupt break with its own well-considered precedents."
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. The Gideon Court instead embraced the older precedents,
which recognized the fundamental nature of the right to counsel. Id. Such recog-
nition "restore[s] constitutional principles established to achieve a fair system of
justice." Id.
41. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. The Court explained: "[R]eason and reflection
require us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person
haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial
unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth." Id.
Furthermore, the Court pointed to the necessity of representation by counsel in
court proceedings:
That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the
money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the wide-
spread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.
The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fun-
damental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours
.... This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with
crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.
1996] CASEBRIEF 1181
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While Gideon established the right of an indigent defendant to court
appointed counsel, it remained unclear whether this right attached only in
felony proceedings. 42 The scope of the right to counsel was settled in
Argersinger v. Hamlin.43 The defendant was charged with a misdemeanor
punishable by either a fine or six months imprisonment, a petty offense.
44
The trial court refused to appoint counsel for the defendant and he was
convicted.45 Rejecting the defendant's claim that he was denied his right
to counsel, the Supreme Court of Florida stated that the right to counsel
only extended to trials "for non-petty offenses punishable by more than six
months imprisonment." 46 The United States Supreme Court reversed, de-
claring that the right to court appointed counsel extends to any criminal
prosecution with a potential of depriving a defendant of liberty, regardless
of the classification of the offense.
4 7
42. See STUCKEY, supra note 6, at 143 (stating question remained after Gideon
whether counsel must be appointed for petty offenses).
43. 407 U.S. 25 (1972); see Bateman, supra note 1, at 89 (discussing present
day status of right to counsel). The Sixth Amendment right to counsel only at-
taches to "critical stages" in a criminal prosecution. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note
27, at 535. The "critical stages" include all interrogation subsequent to the com-
mencement of formal judicial proceedings, pre-trial hearings in which a defendant
requires assistance of counsel and trial court proceedings. Kaufer, supra note 1, at
401. The rationale is that assistance of counsel is unnecessary unless "the substan-
tial rights of the accused may be affected." Id. The greater importance that the
right to counsel assumes after formal proceedings have begun is reflected in the
significant burden states have in establishing waiver. Parker, supra note 1, at 373.
The counsel's role shifts from that of merely protecting the accused from self-
incrimination, as the Fifth Amendment requires, to that of advocating the defend-
ant's case, as the Sixth Amendment requires. Id. See generally Karen Akst Schecter,
Comment, The Right to Counsel: Attachment Before Criminal Judicial Proceedings, 47
FORDHAM L. REv. 810 (1979). For a discussion of the differences between the Fifth
and Sixth Amendment right to counsel, see supra note 1.
44. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 26. The defendant was charged with carrying a
concealed weapon. Id. This offense carried a potential punishment of a $1,000
fine or six months imprisonment. Id.
45. Id. Following trial, the defendant was sentenced to 90 days in jail. Id. In
a subsequent habeas corpus petition, the defendant claimed that "he was unable as
an indigent layman properly to raise and present to the trial court good and suffi-
cient defenses to the charge for which he stands convicted." Id.
46. Id. at 27.
47. Id. at 37. The Supreme Court reasoned that the legal problems in misde-
meanor cases are often just as complex as those in felony cases. Id. at 33. The
Court also pointed to a long tradition of providing counsel to misdemeanor de-
fendants. Id. at 30. While the common law of England did not include the right to
counsel in felony cases, it did provide the right to counsel in petty offense cases.
Id. Furthermore, the Court noted that the volume of misdemeanor cases often
results in "speedy dispositions, regardless of the fairness of the result." Id. at 34.
The Court also emphasized the fundamental nature of the right to counsel and
asserted that "[t] he assistance of counsel is often a requisite to the very existence of
a fair trial." Id. at 31. Thus, the Court concluded that presence of counsel is re-
quired to insure a fair trial. Id. at 37. Significantly, however, this right was condi-
tioned on the actual punishment, not the potential punishment. COOK, supra note
4, § 7:2, at 271 (emphasis added). Thus, it is immaterial whether there is a poten-
tial for imprisonment if a less severe sanction is ultimately imposed. Id. The Court
1182 [Vol. 41: p. 1173
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B. The Sixth Amendment Right to Waive Counsel
Argersinger and Gideon indisputably established the right of an indi-
gent defendant to the assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amend-
ment.48 Supreme Court jurisprudence, however, had also declared that
the Sixth Amendment includes the right to waive the assistance of coun-
sel.49 This inherent tension within the Sixth Amendment raised the issue
of whether a defendant who was constitutionally entitled to the assistance
of counsel could nevertheless waive this right or whether assistance must
be provided to ensure a fair trial. 50 In an attempt to alleviate this tension,
stated that "every judge will know when the trial of a misdemeanor starts that no
imprisonment may be imposed, even though local law permits it, unless the ac-
cused is represented by counsel." Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40. Although the distinc-
tion was only implicit in Argersinger, the Court made this distinction explicit in Scott
v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979). See id. (clarifying present scope of right to
counsel).
48. Krikava & Winking, supra note 15, at 109-10.
49. Augustine Gerard Yee, The Right to Competent Counsel: Extending the Faretta
Waiver, 18 PEPP. L. REv. 909, 916 (1991); see also Adams v. United States ex rel.
McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942) (recognizing right to counsel implicitly embod-
ies "correlative right to dispense with a lawyer's help");Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 464 (1938) (discussing standards to apply to determine proper waiver).
50. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464; see also Krikava & Winking, supra note 15, at 110
(finding that after Gideon, question arose whether defendant who was constitution-
ally entitled to representation could choose to give up that representation and
proceed pro se). The issue of waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is
particularly difficult because the court must balance the individual's freedom of
choice and societal concern with a just outcome. SeeYee, supra note 49, at 916-18
(examining conflict between individual freedom of choice to proceed pro se and
right to assistance of counsel). The court must decide whether to allow a waiver of
counsel knowing that such a decision will probably harm the individual. Id. at 918.
While the decision to waive counsel is usually not a wise one, the court must defer
to the fundamental principle of individual autonomy. Id. This balancing of socie-
tal and individual interests suggests that the right to counsel and the right to waive
counsel conflict. Bateman, supra note 1, at 104. The defendant must choose
either the right to counsel or the right to waive counsel, not both. Id.
Whatever the choice that the defendant ultimately makes, the trial court must
weigh societal concerns when determining whether to allow a defendant to waive
counsel. Id. One societal concern is preventing wrongful convictions. Id. The
decision of criminal defendants to represent themselves increases the risk of an
unjust result. Id. The Supreme Court has continuously recognized the important
role of counsel in criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
69 (1932) ("Without [counsel's help] ... [the defendant] faces the danger of
conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence."). Another
societal concern is the efficient administration ofjustice. Bateman, supra note 1, at
105. Criminal defendants will most likely not be familiar with criminal procedure,
thus causing delays. Id. at 106. Thejudge must delay trial to overcome the defend-
ant's ignorance. Id. This undoubtedly creates a ripple effect on the rest of the
court's docket. Id. An additional concern is the effect on the appellate courts. Id.
With the almost certain conviction of defendants who waive counsel and proceed
pro se comes a flood of appeals asserting that there was an improper waiver of the
right to counsel. Id. In light of these societal concerns, the trial judge must find a
way to protect the interests of society without denying a defendant's constitutional
right to waive counsel. Id.
11
Parker: Constitutional Law - United States v. Goldberg: The Third Circuit
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
courts require certain elements to establish a valid waiver.5 1
The Supreme Court first commented on the requirements for a valid
waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in Johnson v. Zerbst.52 The
Zerbst Court, balancing the right to waive counsel and the right to assist-
ance of counsel, stated that a defendant has a right to counsel "unless he
. . . waives the assistance of counsel. 5 3 The Court warned that a valid
waiver requires an intelligent relinquishment of a known right.54 The va-
lidity of a waiver, the Court stated, must be determined on a case-by-case
basis.55 Furthermore, the Court explained that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel imposes a heavy burden on the trial judge to ensure a
proper waiver, and the Court recommended that such waiver appear in
the record. 56 Thus, the Supreme Court established the general "knowing
The Supreme Court noted the Sixth Amendment's inherent tension in Faretta
v. California:
There can be no blinking the fact that the right of an accused to conduct
his own defense seems to cut against the grain of this Court's decisions
holding that the Constitution requires that no accused can be convicted
and imprisoned unless he has been accorded the right to the assistance of
counsel.
422 U.S. 806, 832 (1975).
51. See Anderson, supra note 6, at 380 (stating that after courts established
right to counsel, they found it necessary to determine under what circumstances
this right could be waived). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's approach to
waiver analysis, see supra notes 48-50 and infra notes 52-73 and accompanying text.
52. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). For a discussion of the facts of Zerbst, see supra notes
31-36 and accompanying text.
53. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 463.
54. Id. at 464. The Court said specifically that "[a] waiver is ordinarily an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Id.
The Court explained that if the right to counsel is properly waived, then the "assist-
ance of counsel is no longer a necessary element of the court's jurisdiction to
proceed to conviction and sentence." Id. at 468. If, however, the trial court does
not provide counsel for a defendant unable to retain counsel, and the defendant
has not "intelligently waived" this constitutional right, the court loses jurisdiction.
Id. The judgment is thus rendered void, and a defendant imprisoned may be re-
leased on habeas corpus. Id.
55. Id. at 464. Specifically, the Court stated: "The determination of whether
there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each
case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including
the background, experience, and conduct of the accused." Id.
56. Id. at 465. The Court explained:
The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by counsel in-
vokes, of itself, the protection of a trial court, in which the accused-
whose life or liberty is at stake-is without counsel. This protecting duty
imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of
determining whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the
accused. While an accused may waive the right to counsel, whether there
is a proper waiver should be clearly determined by the trial court, and it
would be fitting and appropriate for that determination to appear upon
the record.
Id. The burden is on the Government to prove a valid waiver. COOK, supra note 4,
§ 7:13, at 306.
1184 [Vol. 41: p. 1173
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 4 [1996], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol41/iss4/8
and intelligent" standard for a valid waiver.5 7 The Court, however, de-
clined to announce any specific requirements to provide guidance to
lower courts in determining when a "knowing and intelligent" waiver
exists. 5
8
The Court expanded on the "knowing and intelligent" standard re-
quired for a valid waiver in von Molthe v. Gillies.59 In von Moltke, the de-
fendant signed a waiver of her right to counsel, pleaded guilty and was
sentenced to prison.60 In a subsequent habeas corpus proceeding, a plu-
rality of the Court held that the defendant did not have the understanding
and comprehension required for a valid waiver.6 1 Noting that there is a
57. See Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 469 (stating that defendant must have "competently
and intelligently" waived his or her right to counsel). More recently, the Supreme
Court established the standard of a "knowing and intelligent" waiver. Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). The difference, if any, between the "compe-
tent and intelligent" waiver standard and the "knowing and intelligent" waiver
standard is unclear. Bateman, supra note 1, at 90 n.61.
The Court reaffirmed the concept of waiver in Adams v. United States ex rel.
McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942). A defendant who had studied law in the past de-
manded to present his case without counsel. Id. at 278. The court permitted the
defendant to defend himself, stating that "the Constitution does not force a lawyer
upon" anyone. Id. at 279.
58. Anderson, supra note 6, at 381-82. The author explained that after the
"knowing and intelligent" standard was established for waiver, it became clear that
there was a need for states to establish some guidelines to determine what consti-
tuted a "knowing and intelligent" waiver. 1d.
59. 332 U.S. 708 (1948) (plurality opinion).
60. Id. at 709. The defendant, along with many others, was charged with con-
spiracy to violate the Espionage Act. Id. The defendant, a former German count-
ess, allegedly conspired to collect and deliver vital military information to German
agents. Id. The defendant had no money to hire a lawyer. Id. At the arraignment,
when the trial judge was informed that the defendant had neither counsel nor the
ability to hire one, the trial judge said that he would appoint an attorney. Id. at
712. The judge immediately brought the defendant into the courtroom, picked a
lawyer in the courtroom and told him to "help" the defendant out. Id. The attor-
ney at first resisted, but then agreed to help just for the arraignment. Id. at 712-13.
The lawyer did not even see the indictment, or inform the defendant of the nature
of the charges against her. Id. at 713. After the defendant entered a plea of not
guilty, the trial judge said he would appoint another attorney. Id. Without any
legal advice, except that of government FBI agents, the defendant later changed
her plea to guilty. Id. at 715. Before the judge, the defendant stated that she
understood the charges and was voluntarily changing her plea to guilty. Id. at 717.
She then signed a written waiver. Id. The Supreme Court noted that the entire
proceeding took no more than five minutes. Id. The record did not indicate
whether the judge advised the defendant of the implications of the charges or the
consequences of her plea. Id. The judge did not ask whether the defendant was
able to hire a lawyer or why she did not want one. Id. at 718. Thejudge sentenced
the defendant to imprisonment for four years. Id. at 709. In a habeas corpus peti-
tion, the defendant claimed that her sentence was invalid because she "neither
understandingly waived the benefit of the advice of counsel nor was provided with
the assistance of counsel as required by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 710.
61. Id. at 720. The Supreme Court concluded that the defendant did not
comprehend her legal rights despite the fact that the Court found that she was "an
intelligent, mentally acute woman." Id. The Court pointed to Powell v. Alabama to
illustrate that the right to counsel deserves close scrutiny when a defendant is sub-
1996] CASEBRIEF 1185
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strong presumption against waiver, the Court declared that a judge "must
investigate as long and as thoroughly as the circumstances of the case
before him demand" in order to ensure a valid waiver. 62 This duty is not
satisfied by mere "token" or "hollow" compliance. 63 The Court listed sev-
eral requirements for a valid waiver: the defendant must apprehend the
nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the
range of potential punishments, the possible defenses to the charges and
the "circumstances in mitigation thereof. '64 Despite the Court's declara-
tion of specific factors to apply in waiver analysis, most of the lower courts
did not interpret these factors as essential for a valid waiver.
65
The Court attempted to clarify the standards for waiver in Faretta v.
California.66 Addressing the correlative Sixth Amendment right of defend-
ants to represent themselves, the Court reaffirmed the "knowing and intel-
ject to widespread public hostility. Id. The Court found such widespread hostility
in von Moltke, emphasizing that the United States was at war with Germany at the
time, that the defendant was German, that the United States was deeply suspicious
of all Germans and that the defendant was charged with espionage. Id. at 720-21.
Indeed, the Court stated that "[a]nyone charged with espionage in wartime under
the statute in question would have sorely needed a lawyer; [the defendant], in
particular, desperately needed the best she could get." Id. at 721. The Court also
commented on the confusing nature of conspiracy charges under the Espionage
Act. Id.
62. Id. at 723-24. The Court further explained: "It is the solemn duty of a
federal judge before whom a defendant appears without counsel to make a thor-
ough inquiry and to take all steps necessary to insure the fullest protection of this
constitutional right at every stage of the proceedings." Id. at 722. It is not enough
that a defendant states that he or she is informed of the right to counsel and
desires to waive it. Id. at 724.
63. Id. at 723. The "momentary" appointment of counsel, the Court de-
clared, was a mere "hollow compliance" with the right to counsel. Id. The trial
judge never even appointed another attorney until it was too late-after the de-
fendant plead guilty. Id. The signing of a waiver is far from enough to satisfy the
waiver requirement. Id. at 724. Indeed, in this case, it left the judge "entirely
unaware of the facts essential to an informed decision that an accused has exe-
cuted a valid waiver of his right to counsel." Id. In addition, the advice that the
FBI agents gave to the defendant did not imply that the waiver of the right to
counsel was understood. Id. at 726. The Court explained that the Constitution
contemplates the "[u] ndivided allegiance and faithful, devoted service" of lawyers,
not government agents, to provide prisoners with legal counsel and aid. Id. at 725-
26.
64. Id. at 724. Furthermore, the Court asserted that a judge can determine a
valid waiver only "from a penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the
circumstances under which such a plea is tendered." Id. The Court noted that
even "the slightest deviation from the court's routine procedure would have re-
vealed" the defendant's uncertainty about her waiver. Id. at 725. The precise
meaning of the Court's requirement that the defendant must understand the pos-
sible defenses to the charges and the "circumstances in mitigation thereof' is un-
clear. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 27, at 545 n.3.
65. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 27, at 546. The courts are in agreement,
though, that this is the preferred method to determine a valid waiver. Id. For a
discussion of the various approaches of the circuits in determining a valid waiver of
the right to counsel, see infra notes 74-117 and accompanying text.
66. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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ligent" standard necessary for a valid waiver. 67 In Faretta, the trial judge
appointed counsel over the defendant's objections, concluding that there
was no "intelligent and knowing" waiver of the right to counsel.6 8 On ap-
peal, the Supreme Court held that the trial court violated the defendant's
constitutional right to self-representation by appointing counsel over his
objections.69 Discussing the concept of waiver, the Court declared that a
defendant does not need to have the skill of a lawyer to waive the right to
counsel.70 Thus, the Court concluded that the defendant's waiver was
valid. 71 The Court stressed, however, that the defendant should be aware
67. Id. at 835 (citingJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938)).
68. Id. at 809-10. The defendant was charged with grand theft. Id. at 807.
The trial court appointed counsel at the defendant's arraignment. Id. Well before
trial, the defendant requested permission to represent himself. Id. The judge's
inquiries revealed that the defendant had a high school education and that he did
not want to be represented by the public defender because the defendant thought
that his caseload was too heavy. Id. The judge accepted the defendant's waiver,
but declared that it was subject to reversal. Id. at 808. Prior to the trial, the judge
held another hearing to determine the defendant's ability to represent himself.
Id. After inquiring into the defendant's knowledge of various rules of trial proce-
dure, the judge ruled that the defendant had not made a "knowing and intelli-
gent" waiver. Id. at 808-10. After a trial where court-appointed counsel
represented the defendant, the defendant was judged guilty and sentenced to
prison. Id. at 811. The California Court of Appeals agreed that the defendant had
no constitutional right to defend himself and affirmed his conviction. Id. at 811-
12. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. The precise issue on appeal was
"whether a State may constitutionally hale a person into its criminal courts and
there force a lawyer upon him, even when he insists that he wants to conduct his
own defense." Id. at 807.
69. Id. at 836. The Supreme Court affirmatively recognized the right of a
defendant to proceed pro se. Id. The Court highlighted the fact that circuit
courts consistently held that the Bill of Rights protected the right to self-represen-
tation. Id. at 816. The right to counsel, the Court asserted, was intended to sup-
plement the basic right to represent oneself. Id. The Court conducted a review of
the history of the Sixth Amendment and concluded that its structure implies the
right to self-representation. Id. at 819. The Court noted that the only period in
history that counsel was forced upon an accused was the notorious English Star
Chamber. Id. at 821. Furthermore, the colonies included the right to self-repre-
sentation in their colonial charters. Id. at 830. For a general discussion of the
right to self-representation and the Star Chamber, see HELLER, supra note 24, at 5-
14.
The Court attempted to strike a balance between the right to counsel and the
right to self-representation. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 832. Noting the significance of the
right to assistance of counsel for any accused, the Court found that it did not
justify "impos[ing] a lawyer upon ... an unwilling defendant." Id. at 833.
70. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. The Court stated that a defendant "need not...
have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order [to] competently and intelli-
gently ... choose self-representation." Id.
71. Id. The Court pointed to several factors in determining that the defend-
ant's waiver was valid. Id. First, the defendant clearly made his request to proceed
pro se. Id. Second, the record affirmatively showed that the defendant was "liter-
ate, competent, and understanding, and that he was voluntarily exercising his in-
formed free will." Id. Third, the trial judge warned the defendant that he thought
it was a mistake to waive his right to counsel. Id. at 835-36.
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of the "dangers and disadvantages of self-representation." 72 Accordingly,
the Court advised that the record should establish that the decision to
waive the right to counsel was made "'with [defendant's] eyes open."'73
72. Id. at 835.
73. Id. (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279
(1942)). The Court concluded that the defendant made his decision knowingly.
Id. at 836. Thus, the trial judge's decision to appoint counsel violated the defend-
ant's right to defend himself. Id.
Although the Court clarified the prerequisites for a valid waiver of the right to
counsel, the Court declined to give any specified standards. See LFAVE & ISRAEL,
supra note 27, at 554-55 (noting Faretta Court did not view factors listed in von
Moltke as essential). The Court most recently addressed the issue of waiver of the
right to counsel in Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988). In Patterson, the Court
affirmed the requirement that a judge must make a "searching [and] formal in-
quiry" of the defendant to determine a valid waiver. Id. at 299. Patterson involved
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at postindictment questioning of an ac-
cused. Id. at 290. The defendant in Patterson was indicted for murder. Id. at 288.
During subsequent interviews with the police, he was read his Miranda rights, and
the defendant signed a waiver form. Id. The defendant then confessed involve-
ment in the murder. Id. The jury convicted the defendant. Id. at 289. On appeal,
the defendant argued that he had not "knowingly and intelligently" waived his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel before he gave his uncounseled postindictment
confessions. Id. He argued that while the Miranda warnings were enough for a
valid Fifth Amendment waiver of the right to counsel, it was not enough for a
waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id. The Supreme Court rejected
the defendant's claim, concluding that the Miranda waiver was adequate to make
the defendant aware of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the context of
postindictment questioning. Id. at 298. Thus, the Court held that the defendant's
waiver was "knowing and intelligent." Id. at 296. The Court explained that the
Sixth Amendment is not necessarily superior to the Fifth Amendment right to
counsel. Id. at 297. Instead, the Court reasoned that a practical approach to the
waiver issue is utilized to determine the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, examining the importance of the attorney's function in the particular
stage of the criminal proceedings in question and the dangers to the accused of
proceeding without counsel. Id. at 298. The Court explained that at one end of
the spectrum, there are certain pre-trial proceedings where counsel is not required
under the Sixth Amendment, such as postindictment photographic identification,
in which the accused does not require legal counsel to cope with meeting his or
her adversary. Id. In contrast, the Court pointed to the "enormous importance
and role that an attorney plays at a criminal trial ...." Id. The Court explained
that the full "dangers and disadvantages of self-representation" are more obvious
at trial than during postindictment questioning. Id. Because of the heightened
dangers to the defendant of proceeding without counsel, the Court explained that
a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel at trial is subject to the "most rigorous
restrictions on the information that must be conveyed to a defendant, and the
procedures that must be observed, before permitting him to waive his right to
counsel at trial." Id.
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C. The Analysis of Waiver of the Right to Counsel in the Circuit Courts
1. General Waiver Standards- The Defendant's Decision to Waive Counsel
and Proceed Pro Se
Courts have generally looked to Faretta for the applicable standards to
determine a valid waiver of the right to counsel.74 Since Faretta, lower
courts have attempted to find the proper balance between allowing a de-
fendant to exercise the right to self-representation and ensuring that a
"knowing and intelligent" waiver was made. 75 Although the Faretta opin-
ion clarified that the record should establish that the defendant made a
"knowing and intelligent" waiver, the circuit courts interpreted this stan-
dard in several different ways.
76
74. See, e.g., United States v. Swinney, 970 F.2d 494, 498 (8th Cir. 1992) (rely-
ing on Faretta for the applicable waiver standard); United States v. Allen, 895 F.2d
1577, 1579 (10th Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 248
(6th Cir.) (same) cert. denied, 484 U.S. 980 (1987); United States v. Mitchell, 788
F.2d 1232, 1235 (7th Cir. 1986) (same); United States v. McFadden, 630 F.2d 963,
970 (3d Cir. 1980) (same).
75. McDowell, 484 U.S. at 980 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White, in his dis-
senting opinion from the denial of the writ of certiorari, discussed the split among
the lower courts on the matter of waiver of the right to counsel. Id. (White, J.,
dissenting). According to Justice White:
Since Faretta, lower federal and state courts have sought to arrive at the
proper balance between allowing an accused to exercise his right of self-
representation, and at the same time, insuring that a waiver of a defend-
ant's right to counsel is only made when "knowing and intelligent" and
"with eyes open."
Id. (White, J., dissenting). Justice White pointed to the case in point to illustrate
the confusion. Id. (White,J, dissenting). The district court concluded that a short
colloquy between judge and defendant was enough. McDowell, 814 F.2d at 249.
While the Sixth Circuit affirmed, it recommended a new standard for future cases.
Id. at 249-50. Following the lead of the D.C. Circuit, the court invoked its supervi-
sory powers to require district judges in the future to follow the model inquiry set
forth in 1 BENCH BOOK FOR UNITED STATES DIsTIucr JUDGES 1.02-2 (3d ed. 1986),
or one covering the same substantive points. McDowell, 814 F.2d at 250.
Another court stated that "[w]hen the Supreme Court in Faretta announced
the right to self-representation it placed trial judges between a rock and a hard
place." United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1383 (7th Cir. 1991). It further
explained the trial court's dilemma:
Whether the district court honors or denies the defendant's request to
represent himself, the defendant is likely to appeal if he loses at trial.
The appeal will almost inevitably revolve around whether or not the de-
fendant was fully aware of his right to counsel, the benefits he receives
because of that right, and the pitfalls of going alone.
Id.
76. See also Anderson, supra note 6, at 381-82 (explaining that after Supreme
Court determined that waiver of right to counsel is valid if made with "knowledge
and intelligence," courts needed to establish guidelines as to just what constituted
"knowledge and intelligence"); McDowell 484 U.S at 980-81 (noting the variety of
interpretations of Faretta among lower courts) (White, J., dissenting). The Sixth
Circuit noted the questions left unanswered after Faretta: "Since Faretta, a great
many courts have addressed the question of the type of record necessary to estab-
lish that a defendant's waiver of counsel is knowing and intelligent." McDowell 814
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Circuit courts agree that the trial court should follow a certain proce-
dure to determine the validity of the waiver of the right to counsel. 77
Once the defendant requests to proceed pro se, the trial court must make
a careful evaluation of the accused's ability to make a waiver of the right to
counsel. 78 It is usually necessary for the trial judge to hold a hearing to
warn of the dangers of self-representation and to ascertain whether the
defendant understands these disadvantages and their consequences. 79
Some of the dangers of self-representation of which the trial judge should
inform the defendant include: (1) that defending oneself requires follow-
ing technical rules that govern the conduct of a trial; (2) that the prosecu-
tor has extensive experience and training in trial procedure and that the
defendant, unfamiliar with legal procedures, will probably make technical
and tactical mistakes that a lawyer would not; (3) that the defendant com-
prehends the nature of the charges and potential punishment; and (4)
that the choice to proceed pro se precludes an appeal about the compe-
tency of the defendant's representation.8 0 If the defendant persists in the
F.2d at 249. For a discussion of the various interpretations of Faretta among the
lower courts, see supra notes 74-75 and infra notes 77-93 and accompanying text.
77. LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 27, at 554. For a discussion of the standards
for waiver of the right to counsel that circuits consistently require, see supra notes
74-76 and infra notes 78-117 and accompanying text.
78. STUCKrY, supra note 6, at 146; Grace Chung & Alan Sege, Comment, Trial-
Criminal Procedure Project, 81 GEo. LJ. 1267, 1276 (1983); see also Government of
Virgin Islands v. James, 934 F.2d 468, 470 (3d Cir. 1991) (detailing judicial inquiry
essential for waiver of right to counsel); Berkowitz, 927 F.2d at 1383 (declaring
before waiver may be valid, "the trial judge must ensure that the defendant has
knowingly and voluntarily waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel"); Allen,
895 F.2d at 1578 (emphasizing importance ofjudicial inquiry to determine "volun-
tary, knowing, and intelligent" waiver).
79. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 27, at 554-55; see also Berkowitz, 927 F.2d at
1383 ("[T]he judge should advise the defendant about and try to ensure he under-
stands the benefits associated with the right to counsel, the pitfalls of self-represen-
tation, and the fact that it is unwise for one not trained in the law to try to
represent himself."); United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 188 (3d Cir. 1982) (stat-
ing district court should advise defendant of "dangers and disadvantages" of pro-
ceeding pro se) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)). This is
commonly referred to as a "Faretta" hearing. STUCKEY, supra note 6, at 147.
80. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 27, at 554; see also United States v. Mohawk, 20
F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1994) ("In particular, we require proof that the defend-
ant understood his or her 'constitutional right to have [a] lawyer perform certain
core functions,' and that he or she 'appreciate [d] the possible consequences of
mishandling these core functions and the lawyer's superior ability to handle
them."' (quoting United States v. Kimmel, 672 F.2d 720, 721 (9th Cir. 1982)));
James, 934 F.2d at 471 (citing von Moltke factors as essential for valid waiver); United
States v. Mitchell, 788 F.2d 1232, 1236 n.3 (7th Cir. 1986) (advising trial court to
engage in "a much more thorough and extensive inquiry" by asking defendant's
age; informing of charges and possible sentence; ensuring defendant's compre-
hension of charges; instructing defendant to follow Federal Rules of Evidence and
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; and informing defendant to conduct himself
according to rules of court); United States v. McFadden, 630 F.2d 963, 972 (3d Cir.
1980) (pointing to significance of defendant's understanding of charges against
him and range of punishment).
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desire to proceed pro se, the trial judge should inquire into factors rele-
vant to the defendant's ability to understand the waiver of counsel.8 1 Such
factors include the defendant's age, history, prior experience or familiarity
with criminal trials, and prior consultation with counsel in deciding to rep-
resent oneself.8 2
While the above procedure is the preferred method for determining
whether a valid waiver of the right to counsel has been made, it is not
necessarily a constitutional requirement.8 3 The majority of federal appel-
late courts, including the United States Courts of Appeals for the First,
Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits, only require that the
defendant is aware of the disadvantages of proceeding pro se.8 4 This may
be established from the record as a whole, rather than a formal searching
81. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 27, at 554.
82. Id.; see also Berkowitz, 927 F.2d at 1384 (highlighting defendant's college
degree in determination of valid waiver); Meyer v. Sargent, 854 F.2d 1110, 1114-15
(8th Cir. 1988) (pointing to defendant's previous contacts with criminal courts to
infer "general knowledge of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representa-
tion"); Richardson v. Lucas, 741 F.2d 753, 757 (5th Cir. 1984) (listing factors such
as defendant's familiarity with criminal justice system and schooling in law). A
"Faretta" hearing not only enables a judge to properly determine the validity of a
waiver of the right to counsel, but also provides the appellate court with a basis for
review for the probable appeal of the pro se defendant after conviction. LAFAVE &
ISRAEL, supra note 27, at 554. The requirement that courts discuss waiver of coun-
sel in open court with the defendant is well-established. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d at 1383
(advocating formal court inquiry of defendant); United States v. Charrgia, 919
F.2d 842, 847 (2d Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th
Cir. 1989) (same).
83. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 27, at 555; see Chung & Sage, supra note 78, at
1276 (noting failure of court to hold waiver hearing may not be enough to warrant
reversal, especially if trial record otherwise reflects "knowing and intelligent"
waiver); see also Mitchell, 788 F.2d at 1235 (finding failure of trial court to inform
defendant of dangers of waiving counsel was not reversible error). But see United
States v. Martin-Trigona, 684 F.2d 485, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding waiver of
counsel may not be presumed from silent record).
84. See United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 249 (6th Cir. 1987) (discuss-
ing split among circuits); accord Gilbert v. Lockhart, 930 F.2d 1356, 1359 (8th Cir.
1991) (finding no valid waiver despite defendant's eight prior convictions). See
generally United States v. Meeks, 987 F.2d 575, 579 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting defend-
ant "must be aware of the... charges against him, the possible penalties and the
dangers of self-representation"); United States v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 693, 695 (7th Cir.
1992) (stating that defendant "should be well warned of the dangers before he sets
out to represent himself"); Meyer, 854 F.2d at 1114 (noting that "key inquiry" made
by trial court is whether defendant knows consequences of self-representation);
Lucas, 741 F.2d at 757 (noting that trial judge fully disclosed to defendant advan-
tages of proceeding with counsel); United States v. Hafen, 726 F.2d 21, 24 (1st Cir.
1984) (holding that trial court may consider defendant's background experience
in determining defendant's knowledge of disadvantages of self-representation).
The Eighth Circuit, like all of the circuits, is not entirely consistent in their analysis
of waiver. Compare Lockhart, 930 F.2d at 1359 (requiring formal inquiry), with
United States v. Pilla, 550 F.2d 1085, 1093 (8th Cir. 1977) (determining sufficiency
of waiver from record as whole, not formal inquiry).
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inquiry.8 5 Many of the courts adopting this nonformalistic approach, how-
ever, prefer a formal inquiry on the record.8 6
In contrast, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Third, Tenth
and Eleventh Circuits require a "searching inquiry," even if the surround-
ing circumstances suggest a "knowing and intelligent" waiver.87 While this
does not require a rote dialogue, the district court judge must conduct a
special hearing on the record.88 Specifically, the trial judge must warn the
defendant of the dangers of self-representation and establish that the de-
fendant comprehends the consequences of waiver.8 9 Only the Third Cir-
cuit, however, has actually reversed a conviction for lack of such an
inquiry.90
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and District of Co-
lumbia Circuits have rejected both formalistic and nonformalistic ap-
proaches. 9 1 Invoking their supervisory powers, these courts require judges
85. McDowell, 814 F.2d at 249. See, e.g., Meeks, 987 F.2d at 579 (noting that
valid waiver may be found by examining record as whole); Meyer, 854 F.2d at 1114
(finding effective waiver of counsel despite lack of court advisement, emphasizing
defendant's prior experience in criminal justice system); Wilks v. Israel, 627 F.2d
32, 34-36 (7th Cir. 1980) (finding valid waiver despite lack of extensive inquiry).
86. McDoweU, 814 F.2d at 249. See, e.g., Berkowitz, 927 F.2d at 1383 (finding
valid waiver despite lack of proper court inquiry, but advising "the few minutes a
proper Faretta inquiry normally would take is a worthwhile alternative to a new
trial"); Mitchell, 788 F.2d at 1236 n.3 (holding that although lack of thorough in-
quiry did not render waiver invalid, it is preferable for district court to have con-
ducted "a much more thorough and extensive inquiry").
87. See United States v. Allen, 895 F.2d 1577, 1578 (10th Cir. 1990) (asserting
that searching inquiry by trial judge must appear on record); Greene v. United
States, 880 F.2d 1299, 1304 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding invalid waiver due to lack of
inquiry on record); United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 1982) (find-
ing invalid waiver due to lack of inquiry on record).
88. Allen, 895 F.2d at 1578; Greene, 880 F.2d at 1304; Welty, 674 F.2d at 189.
89. Allen, 895 F.2d at 1578 (declaring that trial judge's inquiry must appear on
record); Welty, 674 F.2d at 189 (declaring that waiver is valid only when trial judge,
on record, "has made a searching inquiry sufficient to satisfy him that the defend-
ant's waiver was understanding and voluntary").
90. United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1103 (3d Cir. 1995) (reversing
conviction due to trial judge's insufficient inquiry of defendant); Welty, 674 F.2d at
194 (same). Even the Third Circuit, however, has rejected a "rote dialogue" re-
quirement for a valid waiver. See Government of Virgin Islands v. James, 934 F.2d
468, 473 (3d Cir. 1991) (declining to require detailed list of requirements for valid
waiver of right to counsel). Instead, the proper standard is whether the district
court judge has made "a searching inquiry sufficient to satisfy him that the defend-
ant's waiver was understanding and voluntary." Id. at 473-74 (citing Welty, 674 F.2d
at 189). Similar to other circuits, the Third Circuit looks to the "particular facts
and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience,
and conduct of the accused." Id. at 474 (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,
482 (1981)). An extensive colloquy of some kind, however, is still required. See id.
(finding valid waiver by looking to facts and circumstances of case in addition to
extensive colloquy of trial judge).
91. SeeMcDowell v. United States, 484 U.S. 980, 980 (1987) (White,J., dissent-
ing) (noting rejection by Sixth and D.C. Circuits of Third Circuit's formalistic
approach).
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to conduct a detailed inquiry based upon the Bench Book model instruction
for district court judges. 92 Thus, in these circuits, whenever a district
court judge is faced with a defendant who wishes to represent him or her-
self in criminal proceedings, the proper procedure to follow is either that
defined in the model instruction or one covering the same substantive
points.
9 3
92. See United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 250 (6th Cir. 1987) (requir-
ing courts in future to conduct inquiry as recommended in 1 BENCH BOOK FOR
UNITED STATES DISTmcr JUDGES (3d ed. 1986)); United States v. Bailey, 675 F.2d
1292, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (same). The guidelines provide a list of 16 different
questions to ask defendants when they state that they want to represent themselves.
1 BENCH BOOK FOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES §§ 1.02-2. Some examples of
the recommended questions include:
(1) Have you ever studied law? (2) Have you ever represented yourself or
any other defendant in a criminal proceeding? (3) You realize, do you
not, that if you represent yourself, you are on your own? I cannot tell you
how you should try your case or even advise you as to how to try your case.
(4) Are you familiar with the Federal Rules of Evidence? (5) Are you
familiar with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure? (6) I must advise
you that in my opinion you would be far better defended by a trained
lawyer than you can be by yourself. I think it is unwise of you to try and
represent yourself. You are not familiar with court procedure. You are
not familiar with the rules of evidence. I would strongly urge you not to
represent yourself. (7) Is your decision entirely voluntary on your part?
Id. Furthermore, if the questions are answered appropriately, the judge should say
something to the effect that "I find that the defendant has knowingly and volunta-
rily waived his right to counsel." Id.
93. See McDowell 814 F.2d at 250 (citing BENCH BOOK, supra note 92) (man-
dating substantial but not literal compliance with Bench Book for United States District
Judges). Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has recommended the use of the Bench
Book model, although it is not a requirement. See United States v. Berkowitz, 927
F.2d 1376, 1383 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing BENCH BOOK, supra note 92) (stating that
appropriate inquiry for waiver purposes is found in Bench Book for United States Dis-
trictJudges). The Berkowitz court explained that "[b]y conducting a formal inquiry
such as the one set out in the District Judge's Bench Book, the judge will insulate
the judgment from ... attack .... We realize that such inquiries take time. But the
few minutes a proper Faretta inquiry normally would take is a worthwhile alterna-
tive to a new trial." Id.
Another option for district courts is to appoint standby counsel when a de-
fendant requests to proceed pro se. See United States v. Torres, 793 F.2d 436, 441
(1st Cir. 1986) (recognizing that district court may appoint standby counsel). The
Supreme Court has held that approval of appointing standby counsel over the ob-
jections of the defendant does not violate the defendant's constitutional rights. See
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 184 (1984) ("A defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights are not violated when a trial judge appoints standby counsel-even over the
defendant's objection-to relieve the judge of the need to explain and enforce
basic rules of courtroom protocol or to assist the defendant in overcoming routine
obstacles .... "); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 n.46 (1975) (recognizing
that court may appoint "assistance" of counsel over defendant's objection). The
defendant, however, must maintain actual control over the case. McKaskle, 465
U.S. at 178. The standby counsel merely assists in routine decisions. Id. Neverthe-
less, appointing standby counsel is not a viable solution to the problem of balanc-
ing the interests of the defendant and the judicial system. STUCKEY, supra note 6, at
148. Appointing standby counsel takes up the valuable time of the attorney and
increases court costs. Id.
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2. Implying Waiver From Defendant's Conduct-Limiting the
Defendant's Choice
While the right to counsel is a fundamental and cherished right, it
"may not be put to service as a means of delaying or trifling with the
court."9 4 Thus, courts have recognized a waiver of the right to counsel by
virtue of a criminal defendant's actions.95 Courts are hesitant to validate
an implied waiver because of the possibility of depriving a defendant of his
or her right to counsel. 96 Nevertheless, courts may infer a "knowing and
intelligent" waiver when the defendant engages in "deleterious or manipu-
lative" conduct after repeated warnings from the court.97
One instance where courts may find an implied waiver due to "delete-
rious or manipulative" conduct is where a defendant fails to cooperate
with counsel. 98 A defendant's refusal of representation or firing of coun-
94. United States v. Fowler, 605 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1979).
95. See, e.g., United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 325 (11th Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that defendant's abusive conduct forfeited his right to counsel); United States
v. Meeks, 987 F.2d 575, 579 (9th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that in limited circum-
stances defendant may be forced to proceed pro se). Valid waiver need not be
express in most circuits, but instead may be implied from the surrounding circum-
stances. Chung & Sege, supra note 78, at 1276. For a discussion of the require-
ments for a valid waiver that apply in a majority of circuits, see supra notes 84-86
and accompanying text.
96. Chung & Sege, supra note 78, at 1277-78. There is a presumption against
an implied waiver of the right to counsel. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835; Yee, supra note
49, at 918. Another reason courts are reluctant to find an implied waiver is the
administrative problems that result from an inexperienced defendant attempting
to represent him or herself. STUCKEY, supra note 6, at 147. Such problems include
a longer trial, improper objections and arguments with the judge over rulings. Id.
In addition, courts are reluctant to find implied waiver where the competence or
voluntariness of the waiver is in question. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516
(1962) (stating that waiver of counsel could not be presumed from silent record);
Chung & Sege, supra note 78, at 1278.
97. See United States v. Jennings, 855 F. Supp. 1427, 1443 (M.D. Pa. 1994)
(explaining that "[d] eleterious or manipulative conduct" of accused may waive "by
implication" the right to be represented by counsel), affid, 61 F.3d 897 (3d Cir.
1995). Cases suggest that court warnings are necessary before a waiver will be in-
ferred. See United States v. Allen, 895 F.2d 1577, 1578-79 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding
that defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when trial judge
deemed waiver valid due to defendant's refusal of appointed counsel and failure to
retain counsel). The court explained that "[a] court is under no less obligation to
ensure that waiver is knowing and intelligent when voluntariness is deduced from
conduct than when it is asserted expressly." Id. at 1579; see also United States v.
Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 1982) (requiring inquiry into waiver even if de-
fendant engages in manipulative tactics). The Welty court reasoned: "While we
can understand, and perhaps even sympathize, with the frustration and exaspera-
tion of the district court judge, even well-founded suspicions of intentional delay
and manipulative tactics can provide no substitute for the inquiries necessary to
protect a defendant's constitutional rights." Id.
98. See, e.g., United States v. Fazzini, 871 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding
that defendant's failure to cooperate with four different attorneys constituted
waiver of right to counsel); United States v. McFadden, 630 F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1980)
(holding that defendant's refusal to cooperate with counsel and eventual firing of
counsel waived right to counsel).
1194 [Vol. 41: p. 1173
22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 4 [1996], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol41/iss4/8
sel may also render the right to counsel waived. 99 Furthermore, an im-
plied waiver may exist if a defendant fails to retain counsel within a
reasonable time.10 0
An extreme instance of conduct that a court may infer as a "knowing
and intelligent" waiver occurs when a defendant is abusive or physically
threatening to his or her lawyer.' 0 1 Violence in the court threatens the
criminal proceedings, and courts recognize this behavior as particularly
"egregious.' 1 2 Physical force or threats impair a court's ability to func-
tion and, therefore, such "extreme and outrageous" conduct calls for an
"extreme sanction"-waiver by conduct of the right to counsel.' 03
99. See United States v. Kelm, 827 F.2d 1319, 1322 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding
defendant's refusal to retain counsel or accept appointed counsel constituted
waiver); Richardson v. Lucas, 741 F.2d 753, 757 (5th Cir. 1984) (finding waiver
when defendant refused any representation of counsel); United States v. Wen-
inger, 624 F.2d 163, 167 (10th Cir. 1980) (finding defendant's refusal to hire attor-
ney waiver of right to counsel).
100. See United States v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding
that defendant's failure to retain counsel when financially able to do so waived
right to counsel); United States v. Mitchell, 777 F.2d 248, 258 (5th Cir. 1985)
(holding valid waiver existed when defendant hired counsel known to have con-
flict of interest and failed to retain new counsel); United States v. Fowler, 605 F.2d
181 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing United States v. Uptain, 531 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1976)
(holding that failure to retain counsel in as little as 20 days may imply waiver));
United States v. Terry, 449 F.2d 727 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that where defendant
was given reasonable time to secure counsel and was financially able to retain
counsel, failure to retain counsel was properly treated as waiver).
The Mitchell court explained the effects of a defendant's manipulation of the
right to counsel:
[The defendant] had the fundamental right to a reasonable opportunity
to obtain a particular counsel of his choice. That reasonable opportunity
was afforded [the defendant] in this case. [The defendant] did not have
the right to continue to insist on a particular lawyer and postpone the
trial indefinitely, at the expense of the court, its schedule, the govern-
ment, the other parties, and the orderly administration of justice.
Mitchell 777 F.2d at 258.
101. See, e.g., United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 325 (11th Cir. 1995)
(holding that defendant's threats to counsel forfeited his right to counsel); Jen-
nings, 855 F. Supp. at 1443 (finding that defendant's assault on his counsel in
courtroom waived right to counsel). But see United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d
1092, 1103 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding no valid waiver despite defendant's alleged
threats on counsel's life).
102. SeeJennings, 855 F. Supp. at 1445 (finding defendant's act of physically
striking his counsel to be more "egregious" than conduct in other cases where
waiver by conduct was implied).
103. Id. at 1444-45. The Jennings court discussed numerous problems that
may arise due to the threat of violence. Id. at 1443-44. The defendant here who
assaulted his attorney in court, "figuratively ... struck a blow at the orderly and
efficient administration of justice, and at the heart of justice itself." Id. at 1443.
The court asserted that "[n]o court can carry on its business in an atmosphere of
violence, fear and intimidation." Id. In addition, the threat of violence would af-
fect the prosecuting attorney, witnesses, jurors and even the bench itself. Id. Fur-
thermore, the court added, "the public perception of the courts would be
irrevocably altered, no longer as a place where fairness and justice govern and
individual liberties are protected, but to a place where might makes right." Id. at
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3. Voluntary Relinquishment v. Involuntary Relinquishment
Courts have recognized waiver of the right to counsel in numerous
and varied circumstances, ranging from a defendant's voluntary request to
waive counsel to a defendant assaulting his counsel in court.10 4 Tradi-
tional waiver analysis, however, is applicable only in instances of a defend-
ant's voluntary waiver of the right to counsel.10 5 Courts have failed to
make a distinction between the concept of voluntary waiver-in which a
defendant verbally requests to waive counsel-and involuntary forfeiture
of the right to counsel-in which a waiver is inferred from a defendant's
conduct.10 6 Thus, it is not clear which standard to apply to non-tradi-
tional types of waiver. 10 7 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has also
failed to recognize more than one category of waiver.108 Indeed, the only
recent case to recognize any distinction was United States v. McLeod.10 9 In
McLeod, the defendant dismissed his court appointed counsel following a
guilty verdict, and new counsel was appointed for appeal.1 10 Citing de-
fendant's abusive and threatening behavior, the new counsel eventually
1444. Invoking the separation of powers, the court explained that just as courts
must be free from "political might," they must also be free from "physical might."
The court concluded that "[n] o civilized society can accept the threatened or ac-
tual use of force within its courts and expect those courts to operate effectively or
fairly for all parties involved." Id.
The right to waive counsel and the right to proceed pro se thus appear to be
similarly limited with respect to the termination of the right if the defendant en-
gages in obstructionist misconduct. See Giulianti, supra note 4, at 891-92 (explain-
ing court may terminate right to proceed pro se if defendant engages in serious
misconduct which destroys the courtroom's traditional dignity).
104. For a discussion of cases that implicated waiver of the right to counsel,
see supra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
105. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1099. The court explained that "[tihe most com-
monly understood method of 'waiving' a constitutional right is by an affirmative,
verbal request. Typical of such waivers under the Sixth Amendment are requests
to proceed pro se .... " Id.
106. See id. at 1100 (explaining that only Eleventh Circuit, has made distinc-
tion between waiver and forfeiture). Despite the lack of recognition, courts have
utilized different standards in determining whether there is a valid waiver depend-
ing upon the circumstances of the case. For a discussion of the different ap-
proaches courts use to analyze waiver, see supra notes 74-117 and accompanying
text.
107. See Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1099 (noting that many courts that have ad-
dressed issue of effect of defendant's dilatory tactics on right to counsel are con-
fused about waiver analysis).
108. Id. at 1100.
109. 53 F.3d 322 (11th Cir. 1995).
110. Id. at 323. The defendant, while in jail, filed a civil rights action against
the county deputy sheriff. Id. The deputy testified at the resulting trial. Id. The
court granted a directed verdict in favor of the deputy, and after the verdict, the
defendant threatened the deputy that he was going to kill him as soon as he got
out of jail. Id. The defendant was charged with retaliating against a witness, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(a)(1). McLeod, 53 F.3d at 323. At the ensuing trial,
the jury found the defendant guilty. Id. Court appointed counsel represented the
defendant. Id. After the verdict, defendant's counsel filed a motion for a new
trial. Id. The defendant then filed a motion to dismiss his counsel, and requested
1196 [Vol. 41: p. 1173
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withdrew." 1 The district court found that the defendant's treatment of
his lawyer constituted a waiver of his right to counsel.' 12 Thus, the de-
fendant proceeded pro se in the hearing on his motion for a new trial and
the motion was denied.113 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit asserted that
the defendant forfeited his right to counsel due to his repeated abusive,
threatening and coercive behavior toward his counsel. 114 Significantly,
the court noted that this case involved forfeiture and not waiver because
this was not "an intentional relinquishment of a known right."" 5 The
court found that the defendant's misbehavior resulted in the loss of his
right to counsel, regardless of the fact that no warnings were given to the
defendant that his behavior may lead to loss of this right. 16 Noting other
appointment of new counsel. Id. The district court granted the defendant's mo-
tion and appointed new counsel. Id.
111. McLeod, 53 F.3d at 323. The new counsel submitted briefs on the motion
for a new trial. Id. The basis of the new motion was ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. Id. After these were submitted, though, the attorney moved to withdraw
as counsel. Id. At a hearing on the attorney's motion to withdraw as counsel for a
new trial, the counsel testified that the defendant was abusive and had repeatedly
threatened to sue the attorney. Id. In addition, the defendant asked the attorney
to engage in conduct which the attorney considered to be unethical. Id. The de-
fendant declined the opportunity to testify at the hearing. Id.
112. Id. The district court noted that all the papers, including extensive
briefs, had been filed and in addition, there was a legal assistant who remained
with the defendant to help him find the documents. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 326. The defendant's second attorney testified at the hearing on
his motion to withdraw as counsel that the defendant had verbally abused and
threatened to harm him over the phone. Id. at 325. Specifically, according to the
counsel's testimony, the defendant declared: "Don't you f*** with me. I am going
to sue all of [you]. I am going to sue you and all them other lawyers in the firm."
Id. at 325 n.10. In addition, the defendant claimed that counsel was "setting [him]
up." Id. Counsel also testified that the defendant had threatened to sue him on at
least four other occasions. Id. at 325. He also had attempted to persuade counsel
to engage in unethical conduct, such as having "girls" who worked for the defend-
ant testify on his behalf because they would testify to whatever he wanted. Id. at
325 n.11.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected the
claim that the district court denied the defendant his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. Id. at 324-25. Counsel was appointed to represent the defendant for sen-
tencing and appeal after the motion for a new trial was denied. Id. at 326 n.12.
The first attorney appointed to represent the defendant requested to withdraw
nine days later. Id. The second court-appointed attorney represented the defend-
ant through the sentencing, but was dismissed after sentencing on the defendant's
motion to dismiss counsel. Id. The court then appointed another attorney to han-
dle the defendant's appeal. Id.
115. Id. at 325. The court explained that "[w]e discuss 'forfeiture' rather
than 'waiver' because waiver implies an 'intentional relinquishment of a known
right."' Id. at 325 n.6 (quoting LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 27, at 546 n.4).
116. Id. at 326. The court was concerned about the lack of any warning. Id.
The court noted, however, that the defendant had refused his opportunity to tes-
tify on his own behalf at the hearing on the motion to withdraw counsel. Id. The
defendant refused to take an oath, and thus was not allowed to testify. Id. After
granting the second counsel's motion to withdraw, the judge again asked the de-
1996] CASEBRIEF 1197
25
Parker: Constitutional Law - United States v. Goldberg: The Third Circuit
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
1198 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41: p. 1173
circumstances where a defendant may forfeit constitutional rights due to
his or her conduct, the court concluded that "a defendant who is abusive
toward his attorney may forfeit his right to counsel."' 1 7
D. The Third Circuit's Approach to Waiver of the Sixth Amendment
Right to Counsel
The Third Circuit has adopted a formalistic approach for determin-
ing whether there was a valid waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel." 8 Unlike the majority of circuits, the Third Circuit is rigid in its
requirement that the record reveal a "searching inquiry" of the defendant
to satisfy the trial judge that the waiver was "knowing and voluntary."' "19
The district courts have the responsibility of establishing, on the record,
that the defendant knows the dangers and disadvantages of waiving the
right to counsel, although a particular list of inquiries or advice are not
mandated. 120 The Third Circuit has recommended that the trial judge
advise the defendant, inter alia, of the nature of the charges, the range of
potential punishments and possible defenses to the charges. 12 ' In addi-
fendant if he objected to counsel's withdrawal. Id. The defendant requested that
the court appoint another attorney. Id. Despite defendant's third request for
court-appointed counsel, the court concluded that "[i] n light of [the defendant's]
behavior... we cannot say that the district judge erred by concluding that [de-
fendant] had forfeited this right to counsel." Id.
117. Id. at 325. The court cited examples where a defendant's conduct may
result in the forfeiture of constitutional rights. Id. For instance, a defendant's
misbehavior in the courtroom may forfeit the right to be present at trial. Id. (cit-
ing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1970); Foster v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d
1382, 1388-89 (11th Cir. 1983)). The right to confrontation may be forfeited if a
defendant causes a witness to be unavailable for trial. Id. (citing United States v.
Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 630 (5th Cir. 1982)). An escape from custody also forfeits
defendant's right to be present and to confront witnesses during the trial. Id. (cit-
ing Golden v. Newsome, 755 F.2d 1478, 1481 (11th Cir. 1985)). Furthermore, the
Eleventh Circuit had recognized that the right to counsel may be forfeited when a
defendant fails to retain counsel within a reasonable time, even if this forfeiture
forces the defendant to proceed pro se. Id. (citing United States v. Fowler, 605
F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1979)). Thus, the court concluded by analogy that a de-
fendant's abusive behavior may result in the forfeiture of the right to counsel. Id.
118. See Government of Virgin Islands v. James, 934 F.2d 468, 471 (3d Cir.
1991) (requiring searching inquiry on record to determine proper waiver); see also
United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 249 (6th Cir. 1987) (discussing circuits'
approach to determining whether record establishes "knowing and intelligent"
waiver of counsel).
119. United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 1982).
120. See James, 934 F.2d at 471 (stating inquiry and determination of valid
waiver must appear on record); see also Welty, 674 F.2d at 189 (stating that district
court must establish on record defendant's valid waiver by "bringing home to the
defendant the perils he faces in dispensing with legal representation"). Thus, the
Third Circuit strictly construes the waiver requirements discussed in Johnson v.
Zerbst and Farretta v. California. For a discussion of the Johnson and Faretta opinions,
see supra notes 52-58, 66-73 and accompanying text.
121. James, 934 F.2d at 471 (citing von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724
(1948)).
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tion, the trial judge should advise that: (1) the defendant must follow the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Evidence; (2) lack of knowledge
will hurt the defendant's defense; and (3) the dual role of attorney and
accused will hamper the defendant's defense.122 Also, the Third Circuit,
unlike other circuits, will not "infer a valid waiver of the right to counsel
based upon the district court's subjective overall impression of [the] de-
fendant."12 3 Indeed, the Third Circuit is the only circuit to reverse a con-
viction because the district court did not conduct a searching inquiry on
the record.124
Thus, the Third Circuit has firmly established that a valid waiver re-
quires judicial warnings of the consequences of waiver of the right to
counsel on the record. 12 5 The mandatory nature of judicial warnings in
the Third Circuit suggests that waiver is invalid unless the trial judge ap-
propriately warns the defendant.' 26 The Third Circuit has applied a for-
malistic approach, regardless of whether the alleged waiver stems from a
voluntary request or disruptive behavior.' 27 Thus, the stage was set for the
Third Circuit to reject a pure forfeiture analysis.
122. Welty, 674 F.2d at 188.
123. United States v. Salerno, 61 F.3d 214, 221 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
456 (1995). The Salerno court explained that the appropriate method of determin-
ing a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver is a colloquy between the judge and
the defendant which appears on the record. Id.
124. See id. (concluding district court's failure to conduct searching inquiry of
defendant on record required remand); Welty, 674 F.2d at 192 (reversing defend-
ant's conviction due to lack of any inquiry by district court into whether defendant
understood implications of waiver); cf. United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245,
249 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding district court failure to conduct particular inquiry did
not require reversal of conviction).
125. See McMahon v. Fulcomer, 821 F.2d 934, 946 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding that
despite judge's advice to defendant, he failed to ensure that defendant truly un-
derstood consequences of decision to waive counsel); Welty, 674 F.2d at 193-94
(concluding even when defendant is attempting to disrupt court procedure and
manipulate right to counsel, record must still disclose effective waiver). The Welty
court explained the Third Circuit's requirement for judicial advisement:
Thus, while we do not require a detailed listing of advice similar to that
mandated for guilty plea proceedings conducted pursuant to Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant's waiver of counsel
can be deemed effective only where the district court judge has made a
searching inquiry sufficient to satisfy him that the defendant's waiver was
understanding and voluntary.
Welty, 674 F.2d at 189 (citations omitted).
126. See United States v.Jennings, 855 F. Supp. 1427, 1443-45 (M.D. Pa. 1994)
(distinguishing extreme "egregious" behavior, such as punching counsel, as dis-
tinct from other implied waiver cases where judicial warnings are still required).
127. See, e.g., Government of Virgin Islands v.James, 934 F.2d 468, 470-71 (3d
Cir. 1991) (requiring formal inquiry on record for defendant's voluntary waiver of
right to counsel); United States v. McFadden, 630 F.2d 963, 970 (3d Cir. 1980)
(requiring formal judicial inquiry for defendant's waiver of right to counsel follow-
ing irreconcilable differences with his attorneys).
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III. FACTS OF UNITED STATES V. GOLDBERG
In United States v. Goldberg,128 Goldberg was indicted for forging the
signature of a judicial officer and was provided court appointed coun-
sel. 12 9 Several days before jury selection was to begin, Goldberg filed a
motion for continuance in order to obtain new counsel or in the alterna-
tive, to represent himself.13 0 Finding lack of good cause, the district court
denied Goldberg's motion for continuance.' 3 1 Given the choice of pro-
ceeding pro se or continuing with the court appointed counsel, the de-
fendant chose to remain with his counsel.13 2 The counsel then requested
to withdraw, asserting that Goldberg had threatened his life and also had
requested him to engage in unethical conduct. 133 Granting the counsel's
128. 67 F.3d 1092 (3d Cir. 1995).
129. Id. at 1094. Goldberg was serving a sentence for a previous conviction
when he forged the signature of a magistratejudge on a pass that alleged to permit
Goldberg unrestricted access to the prison's law library. Id. Prison officials discov-
ered the forgery. Id. Goldberg was indicted for forging the signature of a judicial
officer and for making a materially false statement to a federal agency. Id. Pre-
cisely how the defendant was appointed counsel was unclear. Id. Goldberg never
finished a questionnaire to determine his financial ability to retain counsel. Id.
Nevertheless, prior to his arraignment, a federal defender was appointed as de-
fendant's counsel. Id.
130. Id. at 1095. Goldberg's counsel had already filed several motions on the
defendant's behalf. Id. at 1094. In addition, Goldberg's counsel had attempted to
visit the defendant in prison, but the defendant refused to meet with him, after
making him wait over two hours. Id. at 1094-95. Therefore, Goldberg did not
meet his counsel in person, but they did communicate by mail and telephone. Id.
at 1095. Goldberg's motion to dismiss counsel rested on the grounds that his
counsel: (1) disagreed with him on the strategy of the defense; (2) was not "well
versed" in federal criminal procedure; (3) lacked any interest in his case; and (4)
had not met with him and had declined to file motions that he had requested. Id.
Goldberg also provided notice of his intent to pursue an insanity defense. Id. The
district court immediately denied the request to pursue an insanity defense due to
its untimeliness under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.2. Goldberg, 67 F.3d
at 1095.
131. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1095. Immediately preceding jury selection, the dis-
trict court held a hearing to scrutinize Goldberg's allegations that his counsel was
inadequate. Id. After listening to both the defendant and counsel, the court
found that the federal defender was providing adequate representation. Id.
132. Id. Although the district court stated that the defendant was not allowed
to proceed pro se because there was no knowing and intelligent waiver, there is no
indication that defendant clearly wanted to do so. Id. at 1095 n.1. Goldberg, in-
stead, affirmatively chose to remain with his appointed counsel. Id. Unexpectedly,
however, Goldberg then disclosed for the first time that he was financially capable
of hiring a private attorney, and had already conferred with several attorneys. Id.
at 1095. The district court informed Goldberg that if he were able to retain coun-
sel by the start of the trial, the court may reconsider a motion for continuance. Id.
133. Id. The counsel's first request to withdraw was denied. Id. In his initial
request, the counsel had asserted that there was a lack of a proper attorney-client
relationship and that Goldberg was "threatening [him] and demanding that [he]
do certain things that [he does not] feel are prudent." Id. The court denied this
motion, and counsel proceeded to represent the defendant in jury selection. Id.
Prior to the start of trial, counsel renewed his request to withdraw as counsel dur-
ing a telephone conference. Id. Counsel pointed out that Goldberg had re-
[Vol. 41: p. 11731200
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motion, the district court warned Goldberg that because he had the finan-
cial ability to retain counsel, he must either retain an attorney or represent
himself.'3 4 Goldberg did not retain counsel by the start of trial, and the
court refused to grant a continuance.13 5
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Penn-
sylvania found a "knowing and intelligent" waiver despite Goldberg's ob-
jections and continuous assertions of his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.' 3 6 The court concluded that the defendant's manipulative and
threatening conduct waived his right to counsel.' 37 Accordingly, the court
quested this motion to withdraw as counsel. Id. When he refused to do so,
Goldberg allegedly threatened counsel's life, declaring that he had the financial
ability to both retain other counsel and carry out his threat. Id. Without even
hearing Goldberg's position on the matter, the court granted the motion to with-
draw as counsel. Id. at 1096.
134. Id.
135. Id. When Goldberg appeared before the court on the first day of testi-
mony, one attorney who had visited the defendant at prison was present in court.
Id. No private attorney, however, had made a formal appearance. Id. The district
court asked Goldberg if he intended to represent himself. Id. In response, the
defendant presented a letter indicating that an attorney would represent him, but
only if a retainer was paid within 45 days. Id. Goldberg thus requested a continu-
ance to allow him time to liquidate assets in order to pay the retainer. Id. When
the Government opposed the motion, the defendant re-asserted his Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel. Id. Goldberg argued that he had done everything that he
could to retain counsel in the time available. Id. Furthermore, Goldberg main-
tained that he was incapable of representing himself at trial. Id. The district court
held that a continuance would only "delay and disrupt the efficient administration
ofjustice .... United States v. Goldberg, 855 F. Supp. 725, 730 (M.D. Pa. 1994),
rev'd, 67 F.3d 1092 (3d Cir. 1995). Furthermore, the court held that there was lack
of good cause for substitution of counsel. Id. at 730-32. There was an "obvious
lack of merit" and Goldberg failed to substantiate any claim of ineffective assist-
ance of counsel. Id. at 732.
136. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1096. The district court then advised Goldberg how
to conduct himself before the jury and the correct procedure to follow in court.
Id. The Government suggested that stand-by counsel be appointed, but Goldberg
objected, arguing that stand-by counsel was not sufficient to satisfy his right to
counsel. Id. Goldberg continued to assert that he was not making a valid waiver of
his right to counsel. Id. The court, in response, clarified to Goldberg that the
court was not engaging in a colloquy with respect to a waiver. Id. The judge stated
to Goldberg: "I'm determining that your actions have waived counsel, and that was
a knowing and voluntarily intentional act." Id. Goldberg reasserted his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel and objected to the court's finding of a valid waiver.
Id.
It was not until after the court had found a waiver of Goldberg's right to coun-
sel that the court elicited sworn testimony from Goldberg's counsel concerning
the defendant's alleged behavior that led to his motion to withdraw as counsel. Id.
Notably, Goldberg was not a party at the first conference when the court granted
the motion to withdraw as counsel and the court never heard Goldberg with re-
spect to these events. Id.
137. Id. at 1096-97. The court noted that Goldberg had the financial ability to
retain counsel since the beginning of the case, over two months before, and had
failed to do so. Id. The court concluded that Goldberg "manipulated the judicial
system" for his own benefit, and thus refused to grant the continuance. Id. The
court stated that it would not tolerate the defendant's behavior and found that
1996] CASEBRIEF 1201
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then advised him of the correct procedure for representing himself at
trial. 13 8 Goldberg was thus forced to stand trial without assistance of
counsel and he was convicted.13 9 On appeal, the Third Circuit found that
there was no valid waiver and, therefore, held that Goldberg was denied
his fundamental right to assistance of counsel. 140
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Third Circuit's Rationale in Goldberg
The Third Circuit initially noted the underlying tension in this case
caused by the defendant's apparent manipulation of his right to coun-
sel.' 4 ' To begin its analysis of the defendant's claim that the district court
denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Third Circuit empha-
sized that the district court had not engaged in any sort of inquiry as re-
quired by the Supreme Court in Faretta.14 2 Noting that both parties as well
Goldberg's conduct implicitly waived the right to counsel at this trial. Id. The
court emphasized the "clear and unequivocal threat to do serious bodily harm to
his appointed counsel .. .[coupled] with the apparent present ability to accom-
plish [such] physical harm .... Goldberg, 855 F. Supp. at 732. The court further
noted that there are instances in which there is an implied waiver of the right to
counsel. Id. at 730. The district court explained that "[d] eleterious or manipula-
tive conduct on the part of an accused also may amount to a waiver of the right to
be represented by counsel." Id. The court cited United States v. Jennings, 855 F.
Supp. 1427, 1445 (M.D. Pa. 1994), affd, 61 F.3d 897 (3d Cir. 1995), where waiver
by conduct was found due to the defendant physically assaulting his counsel. Id.
The court explained:
There is no material difference between an attempt to manipulate the
right to counsel through physical violence and an attempt to manipulate
the right to counsel through the threat of physical violence. Neither has
a proper place in the orderly and effective administration of justice, and
neither will be countenanced by the court.
Goldberg, 855 F. Supp. at 732.
138. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1096.
139. Id. Goldberg was convicted on both counts of the indictment. Id. The
court sentenced the defendant "to two concurrent terms of imprisonment of 24
months, to run consecutively to sentences he was already serving." Id.
140. Id. at 1103. The Third Circuit concluded that a valid waiver was impossi-
ble here in light of the Government's concession that the district court failed to
inform Goldberg of the risks of self-representation. Id. at 1102-03. For a further
discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis in Goldberg, see infra notes 141-73 and
accompanying text.
141. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1094.
142. Id. at 1099. This reflected the Third Circuit's strict interpretation of
Faretta. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (declaring guidelines for
waiver). For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's approach to waiver analysis,
see supra notes 118-27 and accompanying text.
Goldberg claimed that the district court violated his right to counsel when it
forced him to represent himself. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1099. The defendant argued
that no valid waiver of the right to counsel could be based on his dilatory conduct,
as the district court held. Id. The defendant admitted that there are certain in-
stances where a court may find a valid waiver by conduct, but that this case was not
one that warranted the "drastic" result of forcing the defendant to represent him-
self. Id. The court relied on both Faretta and its decision in United States v. Welty as
1202 [Vol. 41: p. 1173
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as most courts have confused the issue of waiver, the court stated that an
examination of waiver was necessary in order to determine the merits of
the defendant's argument. 143 The court explained that the traditional
idea of waiver actually includes the concepts of "waiver," "forfeiture" and a
hybrid of the two-"waiver by conduct."144
To examine the categories of waiver, the Third Circuit first defined
"waiver" as "an intentional and voluntary relinquishment of a known
right."' 45 A waiver of the right to counsel, the court explained, must be
knowing, intelligent and voluntary.' 46 The court emphasized that the de-
fendant must be aware of the risks of proceeding pro se, and the district
judge must make a searching inquiry sufficient to demonstrate an under-
standing and voluntary waiver. 147
requiring an on the record colloquy demonstrating a knowing, voluntary and intel-
ligent waiver of the right to counsel as well as an explanation by the trial judge of
the risks of self-representation. Id. (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 806; United States v.
Welty, 674 F.2d 185 (3d Cir. 1982)). The Government argued, however, that there
were certain instances where deliberate, abusive conduct "speaks louder than
words" and can result in a waiver of the right to counsel. Id.
The defendant also argued that the district court deprived him of his right to
counsel when it refused to grant a continuance so that he could retain a new attor-
ney. Id. at 1098. The court concluded that there was ample evidence supporting
the district court's determination of lack of good cause. Id. at 1098-99. To deter-
mine this issue, the court examined whether there was "good cause" for the de-
fendant's dissatisfaction with his attorney. Id. at 1098. The court stated that a
district court is required to inquire as to the reasons for a last minute request. Id.
The court defined "good cause" as a "conflict of interest, a complete breakdown of
communication, or an irreconcilable conflict with the attorney." Id. In addition,
the court advised that there are governmental interests that also must be taken
into account, such as the efficient administration of criminal justice and the rights
of other defendants awaiting trial who may be prejudiced by a continuance. Id.
Furthermore, a court has discretion to deny a request for a continuance when it is
made in bad faith or to undermine the judicial proceedings. Id. Noting the dis-
trict court's finding that the defendant's motion was meritless, the court con-
cluded that the record "amply" supported the conclusion that there was a lack of
good cause. Id. at 1098-99.
143. Goldberg; 67 F.3d at 1099.
144. Id.
145. Id. The court relied on the Supreme Court's opinion in Johnson v. Zerbst
as well as Lafave & Israel's CRIMINAL PROCEDURE for authority. Id. (citingJohnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); LAAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 27, § 11.3(c), at
546 n.4). The court stated that waiver is "an intentional and voluntary relinquish-
ment of a known right." Id. (citing Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464). The court further
explained that the most commonly understood form of "waiving" a constitutional
right occurs with an affirmative, verbal request. Id. The court listed requests to
proceed pro se and requests to plead guilty as examples of this concept of waiver.
Id.
146. Id. The court noted the Supreme Court's emphasis on an affirmative, on
the record waiver. Id. (citing Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464). The court further noted that
there is a presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. Id.
147. Id. Citing Faretta, the court advised that a constitutional prerequisite to a
valid waiver of the right to counsel is defendant's awareness of the dangers of pro-
ceeding pro se. Id. (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 806). Furthermore, relying on Welty,
the court mandated that a trial judge must conduct an inquiry before allowing a
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In contrast to waiver, the court described the opposite idea of forfei-
ture. 148 Forfeiture, according to the court, results in the loss of a right
regardless of a defendant's knowledge or intent to waive the right.149
Highlighting the current confusion among courts, the Third Circuit as-
serted that the only court that made the correct distinction between waiver
and forfeiture was the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. McLeod.1 50 The
court explained one instance where forfeiture may occur is when a de-
fendant is abusive toward his or her attorney and the defendant is forced
to proceed without counsel.15 1
To complete the analysis, the court defined the hybrid situation,
"waiver by conduct.1 52 The court explained that once a defendant has
been warned of the loss of counsel if he or she engages in dilatory or
abusive tactics, any misconduct thereafter may imply a waiver by conduct
of the right to counsel1 5 3 Combining elements of waiver and forfeiture,
waiver of the right to counsel. Id. (citing Welty, 674 F.2d at 188-89). Such an in-
quiry of the defendant should include warning the defendant in "unequivocal
terms" of the technical problems he or she may encounter. Id. at 1099-1100 (citing
Welty, 674 F.2d at 188-89).
148. Id. at 1100.
149. Id. This is unlike waiver, which requires "a knowing and intentional re-
linquishment of a known right." Id. The court cited Lafave and Israel to support
its argument that courts have confused the issue. Id. (citing LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra
note 27, § 11.3(c), at 546 n.4).
150. Id. The court explained that McLeod acknowledged the difference be-
tween waiver and forfeiture. Id. (citing United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 325
(11th Cir. 1995)). The Eleventh Circuit held in McLeod that a defendant who was
abusive to his attorney may forfeit his right to counsel. Id. (citing McLeod, 53 F.3d
at 325). Even McLeod, though, did not represent a complete analysis. See id. at
1101 (discussing necessity of recognizing three separate categories of waiver). The
court explained that most courts are confused about the concepts of waiver and
forfeiture. Id. at 1100. To demonstrate this confusion, the court discussed United
States v. Mitchell, 777 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1986). Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1100. In Mitch-
ell, the Fifth Circuit held that a defendant who fails to secure counsel within a
reasonable time period may waive his right to counsel. Mitchel, 777 F.2d at 257-58.
The court reasoned, however, that because the Mitchell court did not discuss the
implications of Johnson or Faretta, the decision actually rested on the idea of forfei-
ture, not waiver. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1100.
For a discussion of United States v. McLeod, see supra notes 109-17 and accom-
panying text.
151. See Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1100 (explaining that McLeod court stated that " 'a
defendant who is abusive toward his attorney may forfeit his right to counsel'"
(quoting McLeod, 53 F.3d at 325)).
152. Id.
153. Id. The Third Circuit suggested that this was more appropriately termed
"forfeiture with knowledge." Id. at 1101. There are numerous cases that involve
waiver by conduct, although courts have not distinguished them from pure waiver
cases. See, e.g., United States v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding
failure to secure counsel when financially able to do so was waiver by conduct). In
Bauer, the magistrate held a hearing to determine whether the defendant was fi-
nancially unable to retain counsel. Id. at 694. The magistrate concluded that,
based on the defendant's ambiguous, evasive and implausible answers, the defend-
ant could afford counsel if he wanted. Id. The Seventh Circuit appointed counsel
to represent the defendant on appeal. Id. The court concluded that the combina-
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the court concluded that waiver by conduct may result if the defendant
receives warnings about the dangers of waiving counsel, even though the
defendant did not affirmatively request to waive counsel.15 4 Although the
Supreme Court has not distinguished waiver by conduct cases from waiver
cases, the Third Circuit interpreted Supreme Court precedent to support
the proposition that a defendant may lose a fundamental right where the
defendant was aware of the consequences of his or her actions, but did not
affirmatively seek to forego the right.155
The Third Circuit next illustrated the significance of recognizing the
difference between forfeiture and waiver by conduct.1 56 On the one
hand, the court held that due to the extreme nature of the sanction, for-
feiture requires extreme dilatory misconduct.1 5 7 On the other hand,
waiver by conduct requires less severe conduct because the defendant is
warned about the consequences of his or her conduct. 15 8 Therefore, the
court concluded, a defendant cannot claim that the right to counsel was
forfeited if he or she was first warned about the consequences of dilatory
conduct.15 9 In addition, a distinction between waiver by conduct and for-
tion of ability to pay for counsel plus refusal to do so waives the right to counsel at
trial. Id. at 695. The court explained:
Faretta did not consider such cases and does not exclude the possibility of
waiver in this fashion. Doubtless any defendant should be well warned of
the dangers before he sets out to represent himself-whether by spurn-
ing proffered counsel or by refusing to dig into his pockets. Bauer was
warned of these dangers. The magistrate judge found out that Bauer
knew nothing of the rules of evidence and procedure, told him that the
rules would be enforced against him nonetheless, and warned him that it
was accordingly foolish to proceed without counsel. Bauer persisted in
his position that he would not retain counsel, because he could not. If
the magistrate judge and district judge were right in concluding that
Bauer indeed could pay, then the stubborn refusal to do so was waiver by
conduct.
Id. The court further rejected the defendant's argument that the magistrate judge
failed to inform him of the operation of the sentencing guidelines, as required in
the BENCHBOOK FOR UNrITED STATES DIsTRICr COURT JUDGES § 1.02(3) (1989), be-
cause this was not part of the Sixth Amendment. Bauer, 956 F.2d at 695. The court
emphasized that the magistrate told the defendant enough to "steer any reason-
able person away from self-representation," and that Faretta requires nothing more.
Id.
154. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1101. The court-issued warnings are commonly re-
ferred to as "Faretta" warnings. Id. at 1100; STUCKEY, supra note 6, at 146-47.
155. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1100-01. The Third Circuit described the circum-
stances of Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). Id. This case held that a trial court
may remove an unruly defendant from the courtroom due to his or her disruptive
behavior once the judge has warned of the consequences of such conduct. Allen,
397 U.S. at 343. Although the Supreme Court did not make it clear whether these
warnings are constitutionally mandated, the Third Circuit concluded that the
Court approved of the idea. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1101.
156. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1101.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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feiture is necessary to assist appellate review. 160 Absent a clear distinction,
the reviewing court would not know whether warnings were necessary, as
with waiver by conduct, or whether a defendant's conduct was dilatory
enough to render the right to counsel forfeited. 161
Applying these analytical categories of waiver to Goldberg, the court
found that although the defendant and the Government argued under
the rubric of traditional waiver, the case actually turned primarily on
whether there was a valid forfeiture.' 62 The court explained that the rele-
vant evidence offered pertained solely to the defendant's conduct. 163
Thus, the case did not involve a traditional voluntary waiver.' 64 In addi-
tion, the court explained that a waiver by conduct analysis was precluded
because the Government admitted that the judge did not issue the requi-
site warnings. 165 The court found that even if the defendant's behavior
was dilatory enough for waiver by conduct, but insufficient for forfeiture,
Goldberg's behavior could not have resulted in a waiver by conduct. 166
Hence, the court was left to decide whether there was a valid forfeiture of
the right to counsel, the only remaining category of waiver. 167
Examining Goldberg's behavior, the court refused to hold that the
defendant's behavior resulted in a pure forfeiture of his right to coun-
160. Id.
161. Id. Because a true forfeiture does not require any warning about engag-
ing in misconduct, the court explained, "[a] district court that refers to 'waiver by
conduct' instead of 'forfeiture' . . . would be on tenuous ground if it failed to
follow the dictates of Faretta and Welty, even if the conduct in the case before it was
sufficiently dilatory to constitute a forfeiture." Id. Thus, the distinction between
waiver by conduct and forfeiture is imperative to generate an accurate record and
aid appellate review of alleged Sixth Amendment violations. Id.
162. Id. at 1101-02. The court reasoned that "[w]hile both parties implicitly
have discussed the central issue in the instant appeal as pertaining to 'waiver by
conduct,' we think 'forfeiture' is the better approach to this case." Id. at 1101.
163. Id. The court explained that Goldberg alleged that his "conduct was not
so dilatory as to warrant the severe sanction of requiring him to proceed to trial
pro se." Id. Further, the court stated that while the Government advanced their
argument under a waiver analysis, in reality it advanced a forfeiture argument. Id.
The Government acknowledged that this case did not fit within any reported case
that deals with waiver of counsel. Id. at 1102. The Government, however, argued
that "actions speak louder than words." Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1101. The defendant contended that his conduct was not so dila-
tory to force him to represent himself. Id. Such extreme punishment, the defend-
ant argued, is only for extraordinary cases. Id. The Government also argued
under the concept of forfeiture and not waiver. Id. Conceding that the conven-
tional way to find a waiver in the Third Circuit is to engage in a colloquy as defined
in Welty, the Government asserted that due to his conduct, Goldberg lost his right
to counsel. Id. at 1102. Moreover, the Third Circuit stated that the district court
also used the forfeiture idea in its analysis. Id. The district court relied on the
findings of Goldberg's dilatory tactics in its holding that he had waived his right to
counsel. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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sel.' 6 8 The court noted that the Third Circuit has never adopted a pure
forfeiture analysis.169 The court added that even if it were to agree to a
forfeiture argument, it required "extremely serious misconduct" which was
not proven in this case.1 70 The court concluded that the defendant's con-
duct could not be used as a basis for forfeiture, because the defendant's
interests were not represented at the court's hearing concerning the al-
leged death threats. 171 Thus, because these threats to counsel were essen-
tial to the forfeiture argument, without this evidence, the record failed to
provide any indication of "abusive conduct" that would forfeit Goldberg's
right to counsel. 172 Accordingly, the court concluded that Goldberg was
deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 173
B. A Break from Tradition: Rejecting One Dimensional Waiver Analysis
1. Distinguishing "Waiver," "Forfeiture" and "Waiver by Conduct"
In Goldberg, the Third Circuit separated traditional waiver analysis into
three distinct analytical categories. 174 The Goldberg court was in a difficult
position-the court was forced to balance the defendant's right to counsel
against the societal interests ofjustice and judicial efficiency.' 75 Although
168. Id.
169. Id. Although the Third Circuit recognized forfeiture in another case, it
was affirmed in an unpublished opinion and therefore, lacked precedential value.
See United States v. Jennings, 855 F. Supp. 1427, 1445 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (holding
defendant's outrageous conduct implied waiver of defendant's right to counsel),
affd, 61 F.3d 897 (3d Cir. 1995).
170. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1102.
171. Id. The court declined to make any finding concerning the implications
on the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process. Id.
The court declared, though, that "an ex parte hearing where the defendant's inter-
ests were not represented cannot be used to justify a post hoc forfeiture argu-
ment." Id. The court added that even in McLeod, where forfeiture was found, the
defendant was allowed to testify at the hearing concerning his conduct. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1103. The court also rejected the argument that the error was
harmless. Id. The court pointed to the well-settled rule that the erroneous depri-
vation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel is per se reversible er-
ror. Id.
174. For a discussion of the traditional waiver analysis, see supra note 57 and
accompanying text.
175. See Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1094 (stating that defendant appeared to be
manipulating his right to counsel to delay his trial); United States v. McDowell, 814
F.2d 245, 248-49 (6th Cir. 1987) (describing difficult position judges face when
forced to determine whether defendant validly waived counsel); Yee, supra note 49,
at 921 (stating right of defendant to choose his or her best defense must be
weighed against governmental interests of fair trial and judicial efficiency). A
court may deny a defendant's right to counsel of his or her choice "if that right
significantly compromises the integrity of the trial process." Id. A court, however,
is reluctant to deny defendant's request because an arbitrary denial of choice of
counsel is per se reversible error. Id.; see also United States v. Salemo, 61 F.3d 214,
221-22 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 546 (1995); United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d
185, 194 n.6. (3d Cir. 1982) (noting infraction on right to counsel never treated as
harmless error).
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one other court had recognized a difference between forfeiture and
waiver, this was the first attempt by any court to divide waiver into three
analytical categories.1 76 The court correctly recognized that all waiver
cases are not the same. 177 Therefore, it was necessary to first determine
the applicable waiver category before any decision could be made whether
the defendant had waived his right to counsel.178
Beginning with the analytical category of "waiver," the court appropri-
ately relied on the traditional concept of waiver-"an intentional and vol-
untary relinquishment of a known right."' 79 The court also correctly
interpreted Faretta to require a "searching inquiry" for a traditional
waiver.18 0 This ensures that the defendant is aware of the risks of proceed-
ing pro se and makes any decision "knowingly and intelligently."' 18 1
Next, the Third Circuit correctly defined "forfeiture" as the opposite
of "waiver." 18 2 A pure forfeiture lacks any voluntariness or intent on the
part of a defendant to relinquish the right to counsel.' 83 Thus, it was ap-
propriate to require egregious conduct for forfeiture because it is such a
176. See United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 325 (1lth Cir. 1995) (recogniz-
ing distinction between waiver and forfeiture). For a discussion of the Eleventh
Circuit's holding in McLeod, see supra notes 109-17 and accompanying text.
177. For a discussion of the various circumstances where waiver may be impli-
cated, see supra notes 94-117 and accompanying text.
178. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1099. Noting the confusion among courts and the
parties to this case concerning the "important distinction" among the types of
waiver that exist, the court emphasized that "the resolution of ... [the] confusion
has important implications for the Sixth Amendment .... " Id. Thus, before the
court could turn to the merits of the case, it was necessary for the court to discuss
waiver, waiver by conduct and forfeiture. Id.
179. Id. (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1937)) (describing
waiver as intentional relinquishment of known right or privilege).
180. Id. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's holding in Faretta v. Califor-
nia, see supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
181. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (discussing require-
ments for waiver).
182. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1100. See LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 27, at 545-46(describing difference between forfeiture and waiver). Forfeiture occurs when a
defendant is forced to proceed pro se. Id. at 546. Although courts have commonly
referred to these cases as involving waiver, it is more appropriately termed forfei-
ture. Id. One author explained:
What these courts have held, in effect, is that the state's interest in main-
taining an orderly trial schedule and the defendant's negligence, indiffer-
ence, or possibly purposeful delaying tactic, combined to justify a
forfeiture of defendant's right to counsel in much the same way that de-
fendant's disruptive behavior or voluntary absence can result in the for-
feiture of his right to be present at trial.
Id. It is interesting to note that the only two courts to have made this distinction,
Goldberg and McLeod, cited this treatise for the proposition that waiver and forfei-
ture of the right to counsel are two distinct ideas. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1100; United
States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 325 (11th Cir. 1995).
183. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1100.
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drastic measure and impedes the constitutional rights of defendants.184
The court, however, failed to provide a clear standard for the "extremely
serious misconduct" necessary to trigger a forfeiture.1 85 Because waiver by
conduct may only be implied if the court affirmatively warns the defend-
ant of the consequences of his or her conduct, the Third Circuit correctly
concluded that waiver by conduct requires less extreme conduct. 186 Sig-
nificantly, the Third Circuit's definition of "waiver by conduct" was further
supported by Supreme Court jurisprudence. 18 7
As the Third Circuit noted, identifying distinct categories within
waiver of the right to counsel has significant implications on the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel and appellate review.1 88 The court sug-
gested that there were only two forms of implied relinquishment of the
right to counsel due to conduct-forfeiture and waiver by conduct. 189
Although the court advised that the required severity of conduct corre-
sponds to the severity of the sanction-forfeiture requires extreme con-
duct, while waiver by conduct requires less extreme conduct-the court
did not clarify the threshold warnings necessary to implicate a waiver by
conduct analysis instead of a forfeiture analysis. 190
2. Applying the Categories of Waiver of the Right to Counsel
The court properly found that waiver by conduct was precluded here
in light of the lack of any judicial warnings on the record.' 9 1 Left with
only the category of forfeiture, the court rejected the Government's argu-
184. See United States v. Jennings, 855 F. Supp. 1427, 1444 (M.D. Pa. 1994)
(explaining extreme conduct requires extreme sanction of forfeiture of right to
counsel), affd, 61 F.3d 897 (3d Cir. 1995).
185. See Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1101 (stating forfeiture requires "extremely dila-
tory conduct" without further explanation).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1100-01. While the elements that the Supreme Court would re-
quire for different levels of waiver analysis are still uncertain, the Third Circuit's
interpretation of Illinois v. Allen as recognizing the hybrid concept of "waiver by
conduct" was fair. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970) (requiring warn-
ing, but not intent for valid waiver of defendant's right to be present at trial). The
Goldberg court analogized waiver by conduct to the trial judge's privilege to exclude
a defendant from trial if the defendant engages in disruptive or disrespectful con-
duct. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1101.
188. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1101. For a discussion of the impact of the opinion
in Goldberg, see infra notes 199-205 and accompanying text.
189. See Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1100-01 (describing waiver as voluntary, but
waiver by conduct and forfeiture as involuntary result of defendant's conduct).
190. See id. (asserting that waiver by conduct requires warnings about conse-
quences of defendant's conduct, with no further explanation). The court most
likely was referring to the Faretta-style warnings. See id. at 1100 (explaining that no
valid waiver occurs unless defendant receives Faretta warnings). The Supreme
Court, however, has not attempted to clarify these standards, and confusion re-
mains. See United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 249 (6th Cir. 1987) (discuss-
ing confusion among circuits); Parker, supra note 1, at 364-65 (describing
Supreme Court's unclear standards of waiver).
191. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1101.
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ment that a forfeiture occurred solely due to the defendant's conduct.
Declining to make any statement about the necessary "technical due pro-
cess," the court nevertheless relied on the defendant's absence from the
evidentiary hearing to disregard the defendant's alleged death threats.19 2
Left with little other evidence of "abusive conduct," the court had no
choice but to remand the case. 193 The court, however, suggested that the
defendant's death threats would have been dilatory enough for waiver by
conduct if proper procedure was followed.' 9 4 It thus remains unclear
whether the Third Circuit will only find a valid waiver if the defendant was
informed of the risks of self-representation, regardless of the severity of
the defendant's behavior. Refusing to recognize that a forfeiture of the
right to counsel can occur as a matter of law leaves the door open for
manipulative, egregious conduct.
3. Consistency of Result Within Third Circuit Cases
The Third Circuit's reluctance to find forfeiture was consistent with
Third Circuit waiver of the right to counsel precedent.' 9 5 Strictly constru-
ing Faretta and von Moltke, the Third Circuit has consistently required a
formal, on the record colloquy to ensure a "knowing and intelligent" deci-
sion. 196 Determining that such a warning must also exist for a waiver by
conduct, then, was a natural progression for the court. In addition, the
court's reluctance to adopt a pure forfeiture analysis reflects the Third
Circuit's formalistic approach of requiring judicial warnings for a valid
waiver. The Third Circuit is protective of the right to counsel, and there-
fore, the court is likely to invalidate the defendant's waiver whenever there
is no Faretta-type warning. 19 7 The Third Circuit appears to preclude a
valid waiver unless the defendant is warned of the dangers of self-represen-
tation. Such an inflexible standard for determining waiver is disturbing
192. Id. at 1102.
193. See id. (holding without alleged death threats, record insufficient to find
"abusive conduct"). The court, however, declined to recommend any procedural
requirements for fact-finding regarding a defendant's alleged conduct. See id.
(commenting that ex parte hearing on evidence undermines due process, but re-
fraining from advising future procedure).
194. See id. (stating without evidence of death threats, record was otherwise
insufficient for forfeiture).
195. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's approach to waiver analysis, see
supra notes 118-27 and accompanying text.
196. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's reluctance to find a valid waiver of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, see supra notes 118-27 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's opinion in von Moltke and Faretta, see
supra notes 59-73 and accompanying text.
197. See United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 249 (6th Cir. 1987) (ex-
plaining that Third Circuit was only circuit to reverse conviction when lower court
failed to make searching inquiry). This is problematic because an overprotective
court may infringe on a defendant's right to waive counsel and proceed pro se,
and may be subject to reversal. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834-36
(1975) (declaring court may not force counsel upon unwilling defendant).
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because the defendant may engage in extreme dilatory conduct as long as
the trial judge fails to issue warnings to the defendant. Thus, the defend-
ant is permitted to mock the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 198
V. IMPACT
The Third Circuit established three categories of waiver analysis in
Goldberg, rejecting traditional waiver analysis and the inconsistent results it
produced.1 99 Other circuits should follow the Third Circuit's lead in rec-
ognizing the various ways that a defendant may lose his or her Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in order to clarify the appropriate analysis
for waiver cases.
The recognition of different forms of waiver has a significant effect on
a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. 200 A defendant should not be de-
prived of his or her right to counsel without proper court warnings. 20 1 A
defendant, however, should also not be permitted to engage in extreme
conduct or manipulate the right to counsel. 20 2 Differentiating between
waiver by conduct and forfeiture provides a balance for these competing
interests. The defendant's right to counsel is protected by fixed waiver
requirements under the waiver by conduct analysis, but "extreme or ma-
nipulative" conduct is not permitted under the forfeiture analysis. Further
definition of "extreme" conduct, nevertheless, is necessary to clarify the
distinction between waiver by conduct and forfeiture.
198. See Anderson, supra note 6, at 385-86 (commenting that informal re-
quirements may result in less reversals based on technicalities). Formal require-
ments may lead to reversals based on procedural technicalities. Id.; see Goldberg, 67
F.3d at 1102-03 (reversing conviction due to procedural technicality). Allowing
some flexibility permits a court to determine on a case-by-case basis what is truly
fair. See Anderson, supra note 6, at 386 (explaining that non-formal requirements
could lead to a "truer form of justice"). Informal requirements, however, create
problems such as inconsistent application of the right to waive counsel and arbi-
trary decisions. Id. For a further discussion of the problems resulting from un-
clear waiver requirements, see supra notes 6, 15 and accompanying text.
199. See Parker, supra note 1, at 364-65 (describing inconsistency of applica-
tion of Sixth Amendment rights due to unclear Supreme Court guidelines). Tradi-
tional waiver analysis recognized only one form of waiver. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835.
For a discussion of the three categories of waiver explained in Goldberg, see supra
notes 141-73 and accompanying text.
200. See Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1101 (discussing implications of different levels of
waiver analysis on Sixth Amendment rights).
201. See Bateman, supra note 1, at 104-06 (describing burden on courts due to
inevitable appeals of defendants who represented themselves).
202. See United States v. Allen, 895 F.2d 1577, 1578 (10th Cir. 1990) (describ-
ing limits of right to waive counsel). The Allen court explained that the defend-
ant's right to waive counsel "does not grant the defendant license 'to play a "cat
and mouse" game with the court, or by ruse or stratagem fraudulently seek to have
the trial judge placed in a position where ... the judge appears to be arbitrarily
depriving the defendant of counsel."' Id. (quoting United States v. McMann, 386
F.2d 611, 618-19 (2d Cir. 1968)). For a discussion of the policy reasons for prohib-
iting abusive conduct in the courtroom, see supra notes 104-17 and accompanying
text.
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Until the Supreme Court settles the appropriate analysis of waiver of
the right to counsel, courts should require warnings on the record to
achieve a valid waiver.203 Courts should allow an exception to this rule,
however, where a defendant engages in extreme conduct and recognize
that forfeiture of the right to counsel may occur as a matter of law.20 4
Otherwise, even a defendant's extreme conduct will not result in waiver of
the right to counsel if the court did not give the proper warnings. Further-
more, the Third Circuit must be more willing to find forfeiture when the
defendant has engaged in extreme or manipulative conduct. 20 5 Violent,
disruptive behavior has no place in the courtroom.
Jennifer Elizabeth Parker
203. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's approach to waiver analysis, see
supra notes 118-27 and accompanying text.
204. See Anderson, supra note 6, at 385 (suggesting formal requirements may
lead to reversals based on technical procedures).
205. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834-35 n.46 (1975) (noting that
right to represent oneself does not include right to destroy dignity of courtroom);
United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (finding right of
self-representation rests on presumption of reasonable cooperation); Tait v. State,
362 So. 2d 292, 293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (noting that judge has duty to pre-
vent "roman circus" in courtroom), rev'd, 387 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1980).
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